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ERICKSON v. BARTELL: THE “COMMON SENSE” APPROACH TO 
EMPLOYER-BASED INSURANCE FOR WOMEN 
  We do not want special privileges.  We do not need special privileges.  We 
outlast you—we outlive you—we nag you to death.  So why should we want 
special privileges? 
  I believe we can hold our own.  We are entitled to this little crumb of 
equality. 
  The addition of that little terrifying word “s-e-x” will not hurt this 
legislation in any way.  In fact, it will improve it.  It will make it 
comprehensive.  It will make it logical.  It will make it right.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over eighty years ago American women received the right to vote.2  Forty-
nine years ago Congress declared sex-based employment discrimination 
unlawful in Title VII.3  Twenty-nine years ago a woman’s right to make her 
own decisions about her reproductive health was buttressed by Roe v. Wade.4  
In 2001, two women, Roberta Riley and Jennifer Erickson, were added to Ms. 
Magazine’s “Woman of the Year” list,5 and for good reason: they helped to 
continue this trend.  In the spring of 2001, a district court aided that effort by 
deciding that commonly used prescription contraceptives must be covered by 
employer-based prescription drug plans.6  Indeed, in an ongoing effort to 
 
 1. 110 CONG. REC. H2581 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep. St. George).  This is 
a brief excerpt of the argument made by Representative St. George to the House of 
Representatives to include “sex” in Title VII. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of Sex.”). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 5. Woman of the Year, MS. Dec. 2001-Jan. 2002, available at 
http://www.msmagazine.com/dec01/woty.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).  Roberta Riley was the 
attorney for Jennifer Erickson, the class representative for the non-union female employees of 
Bartell Drug Company in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 
2001).  Though this effort to mandate prescription contraceptive coverage did not begin, nor will 
it end, with these two women, their case prompted a court, for the first time in our history, to 
mandate this coverage in the context of employer-based prescription plans.  See id. 
 6. This holding was directed only at employer-based insurance plans that covered 
prescription drugs. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  In Erickson, the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
464 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:463 
achieve a greater degree of equality in all facets of their lives, American 
women have persevered to take control of their bodies, health and 
reproduction.7  Riley and Erickson’s active pursuance of this goal has brought 
to women8 the benefit of mandatory prescription drug coverage, but has also 
opened the door for further movement toward a truer sex equality in the 
workplace.9  As Margaret Graham Tebo wrote, “Margaret Sanger would be 
thrilled.”10 
On June 12, 2001, the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Washington, in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Company,11 held that an 
employer’s prescription drug plan must provide at least partial coverage to 
contraceptive devices such as birth control pills, intra-uterine devices, 
diaphragms, the Depro-Provera shot and implants such as Norplant.12  This 
case of first impression13 marked a major step in the lengthy struggle to thwart 
 
prescription drug coverage was comprehensive.  Id. at 1268.  However, the Erickson holding does 
not apply to insurance plans that exclude prescription drug coverage completely.  Id. at 1272. 
 7. While the problems in prescription drug coverage set forth by Erickson were solely legal 
questions, the legal team behind the plaintiff realized that the public needed to hear about the 
case.  To accomplish this goal, they hired the P.R. firm of Douglas Gould & Co. to create “a pro-
active strategic media campaign” for the case in order to spread the word to many national 
newspapers, most (if not all) of the major television networks, and other media.  Douglas Gould 
& Co., Erickson v. Bartell—Reproductive Rights and Contraceptive Policy, at 
http://www.douglasgould.com/pages/reprorights.htm (last visited May 13, 2002). 
 8. Erickson, a district court case, only applies to women and employers in the State of 
Washington. 
 9. Planned Parenthood created a web site to answer questions about Erickson and its effect 
on other states and employers.  See Planned Parenthood, Cover My Pills: Fair Access to 
Contraceptives, at http://www.covermypills.org.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2002).  As of Fall 
2001, however, sixteen states had laws that required “insurance companies that cover 
prescriptions to also include full contraceptive coverage”:  California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas and Vermont.  Sierra Club, Senate Committee Discusses 
Domestic Insurance Contraceptive Coverage, POPULATION REPORT, Fall 2001, at 1, available at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/population.  See also Susan A. Cohen, Federal Law Urged As 
Culmination of Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Campaign, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON 
PUBLIC POLICY, Oct. 2001, at 11. 
 10. Margaret Graham Tebo, Power to the Pill, A.B.A.  J., Sept. 2001, at 22, 22 (2001).  
Thrilled, indeed.  “Nearly a century after the women’s rights advocate began her crusade to 
overturn laws banning contraception for women, a federal District Court has ruled that excluding 
prescription birth control coverage from health insurance plans is a violation of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act.”  Id.  For a short description of the social causes that Margaret Sanger 
supported, see Planned Parenthood, About Us:  Margaret Sanger, at 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about/thisispp/sanger.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
 11. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 12. Id. at 1277. 
 13. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Decision on Coverage of 
Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-
contraception.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002).  While Erickson was the first court to hold that 
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sex discrimination in the workplace stemming from inequitable employer-
based prescription drug plans. 
Erickson is a welcome addition to the body of law surrounding Title VII 
and its subsequent amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).  
Undoubtedly, the coverage it provides will make contraception more 
affordable and accessible to women and greatly reduce the costs—physical, 
emotional and financial—associated with the thousands of unintended and 
unplanned pregnancies occurring each year.14  Before celebrating this long-
awaited step, however, there is a need to examine the long road of law leading 
up to Erickson, as well as its many possible effects.  To be sure, the effects of 
Erickson involve, at the least, both practical and legal concerns. 
The practical effects of Erickson are quite impressive.  Erickson’s 
interpretation of Title VII sex discrimination will impose new obligations on 
employers with respect to the medical benefits they choose to extend to their 
employees.  In addition, Erickson will have second-hand effects on both the 
insurers utilized by employers as well as the masses of paying beneficiaries.  
The cost of this new statutory requirement must be absorbed somewhere.  And 
finally, the social, political and economic impacts of the holding will affect all 
citizens, as women and families are given a greater opportunity to prevent 
unanticipated pregnancies.  It goes without saying that a degree of uncertainty 
will unquestionably accompany any estimates on the true ramifications of 
Erickson. 
While working women and spouses of working men nationwide will, 
without doubt, welcome the new benefit of partial coverage of contraceptive 
 
prescription contraceptives must be covered by employer-based prescription plans in accordance 
with Title VII, the EEOC has come to that same conclusion at least twice.  Id.  The EEOC 
Decision of December 14, 2000 was in response to two women who were denied coverage for 
prescription birth control, despite the fact that the plans covered prescription drugs, preventative 
care, vaccinations and surgical means of contraception such as vasectomies and tubal ligations.  
Id.  The EEOC concluded that in order for an employer to avoid violating Title VII, employers 
“must cover the expenses of prescription contraceptives to the same extent, and on the same 
terms, that they cover the expenses of the types of drugs, devices and preventative care . . . [and 
the employer’s] coverage must extend to the full range of prescription contraceptive choices.”  Id.  
A similar issue was pending in another case, EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 
2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001) (hereinafter “UPS”).  UPS focused on allegations of disparate treatment 
and disparate impact under Title VII when the UPS employee was denied coverage for his wife’s 
prescription oral contraceptive, which was prescribed to treat a hormonal disorder, not to prevent 
pregnancy.  Id. at 1217. 
 14. See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. 
REV. 363, 364-65 (1998).  “Almost sixty percent of the 6.3 million pregnancies that occur 
annually in the United States are unintended.”  Id. at 364.  Professor Law also described the costs 
and consequences of unintended pregnancies: “Unintended pregnancy: (1) increases infant 
mortality and morbidity; (2) generates financial costs for childbirth and the care of distressed 
newborns; (3) leads to high rates of abortion; and (4) limits women’s abilities to perform and 
contribute to society and undermines national economic stability.”  Id. at 364-65. 
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devices in their prescription benefit plans, the holding seems to predict a 
massive resource shift between insurance companies and their beneficiaries, 
yielding resistance from insurers and employers.  In addition, the applicability 
of Erickson may be questioned; it is difficult to assess, at this point, whether 
more women will utilize these contraceptive measures or if the result will be a 
reduction of costs for the women currently taking the medications, or both.  In 
any case, the medical and economic benefits of Erickson for men, women and 
children, as well as their insurers and employers, should far outweigh its 
negative effects. 
This Note will examine Erickson in the context of a continually developing 
body of law championing the procurement of true sex equality in the 
workplace.  It will begin by discussing the theories of discrimination argued by 
the plaintiff in Erickson: disparate treatment and disparate impact under Title 
VII and the PDA.  It will also retrace the development of the statutes and the 
case law comprising this body of law, including Title VII sex discrimination 
before and after its amendment by the addition of the PDA.  Finally, this Note 
will discuss the issues, arguments, reasoning and holding of Erickson, and its 
significance and impact for female employees, and conclude with an 
elaboration of responses to Bartell’s arguments. 
II.  THEORIES OF TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT AND 
DISPARATE IMPACT 
Before discussing the application of Title VII to the facts in Erickson and 
cases preceding it, an overview of the different ways in which Title VII may be 
violated must be presented.  The code created by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
governing Title VII discrimination, provides that 
 (a) Employer Practices 
  It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.15 
 
 15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000).  Section 2000e-2(a)(1) corresponds with the 
disparate treatment theory of discrimination, while section 2000e-2(a)(2) corresponds with the 
disparate impact theory of discrimination. 
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Title VII may be violated by the performance of acts that discriminate in 
two ways: through disparate treatment,16 which is intentional discrimination, 
and disparate impact,17 which involves discriminatory effects stemming from a 
facially neutral policy.  Both theories of discrimination were argued by the 
employee-claimant in Erickson.18  The Supreme Court noted the differences 
between these two theories in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States: 
“Disparate treatment” . . . is the most easily understood type of 
discrimination.  The employer simply treats some people less favorably than 
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  Proof of 
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred 
from the mere fact of differences in treatment. . . . Claims of disparate 
treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress “disparate impact.” . . . 
[that] involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment 
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another 
and cannot be justified by business necessity.19 
A. Disparate Treatment under Title VII 
Under the disparate treatment theory “[a] plaintiff alleging a claim of 
disparate treatment must establish that the employer intended to discriminate 
against the protected group.  If direct evidence20 of discriminatory intent is not 
available, a plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence from which an 
inference of intentional discrimination may be drawn.”21  The Supreme Court 
established the burden-shifting framework for Title VII discrimination claims 
 
 16. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See also City of Los 
Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding that an 
employment practice requiring all female employees to contribute more money than male 
employees into a benefits fund exhibited disparate treatment when it “[did] not pass the simple 
test of whether the evidence show[ed] ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that 
person’s sex would be different.’”) (quoting Developments in the Law, Employment 
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1170 
(1971)); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (holding that an 
employer’s treatment of employees less favorably due to their race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin constituted disparate treatment in violation of Title VII). 
 17. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
 18. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 n.2 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 19. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 20. Cases involving direct evidence of discrimination do not require the burden-shifting 
framework.  One case involving a showing of direct evidence of race-based employment 
discrimination is Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 21. Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Troupe v. 
May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
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alleging disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green;22 this 
evidentiary burden-shifting requirement may be broken down into three steps. 
First, 
[t]he complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the 
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  This may be 
done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) 
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, 
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants 
from persons of the complainant’s qualifications.23 
This initial burden, which rests solely on the employee, constitutes the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case24 and creates a rebuttable presumption25 that the 
Title VII prohibited discrimination occurred.  Second, “[t]he burden then must 
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
 
 22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); See generally Armstrong, 33 F.3d 1308.  The sex discrimination 
alleged, though not proven, in Armstrong, was for the loss of a position of employment due to 
sex, when a pregnant nurse was terminated from her job after refusing to treat an HIV positive 
patient.  Id. at 1310-11.  She felt that the patient’s high risk for contracting opportunistic diseases 
would put her fetus at risk.  Id.  Her termination was not found to be discriminatory.  Id. at 1318. 
  Though Armstrong was based on an allegation of sex discrimination via unlawful 
termination, and was not based on a differential in employee benefits based on sex, these prima 
facie elements are still more applicable to the sex discrimination claims in Erickson than the race-
based prima facie elements from McDonnell Douglas.  Furthermore, though Armstrong  is not a 
Supreme Court case, it explained the theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact 
particularly well and, therefore, applied the statutory requirements (as opposed to the common 
law requirements predating codification) for a showing of disparate impact.  For these reasons 
Armstrong is a helpful source in understanding disparate treatment and disparate impact in Title 
VII sex discrimination cases. 
  Under the disparate treatment theory in Armstrong, the elements of a prima facie Title 
VII sex discrimination claim required the claimant to show that: 
(1) the plaintiff [was] a member of a group protected by Title VII; 
(2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position; 
(3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse effect on her employment; and 
(4) the plaintiff suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules. 
Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1314 (citing Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp. Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 
(M.D. Ala. 1993)). 
 23. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).  Burdine elaborated 
on the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the presumption it created.  Id.  “The prima facie case 
‘raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise 
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.’  
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer 
unlawfully discriminated against the employee.”  Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567 (1978)). 
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for the employee’s rejection.”26 “The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put 
forward by the defendant . . . may, together with the elements of the prima 
facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.  Thus, rejection of the 
defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate 
fact of intentional discrimination. . . .”27  Finally, the employee must be 
afforded a chance to show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was in 
reality “a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by [Title VII].”28  
This burden—to show that the defendant’s justification was merely a pretext—
belongs to the claimant,29 thereby vesting the “ultimate burden of persua[sion]” 
on the claimant.30 
B. Disparate Impact under Title VII 
Again, the statutory language governing disparate impact under Title VII 
was laid out in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2): 
(a)  It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
  . . . . 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.31 
 
 26. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 27. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).  See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
254.  In Burdine, the Court concluded that this was not a permissive finding for the jury to make, 
but instead a mandatory one, if the defendant failed to rebut the presumption.  Id.  “If the trier of 
fact believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, 
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.”  Id. 
 28. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.  In McDonnell Douglas, the employer’s excuse for 
not re-hiring the former employee was that the employee engaged in disruptive and illegal 
demonstrations against the employer—a “lock-in” and “stall-in”—as a participant in a civil rights 
organization protesting against the employer.  Id. at 795.  While McDonnell Douglas held that an 
employee-complainant in a Title VII claim must have the opportunity to show that the employer-
defendant’s legitimate reasons were pretextual, it also pointed out that an employer “may 
justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if 
this criterion is applied alike to members of all races.”  Id. at 804.  The McDonnell Douglas Court 
also set forth some examples of evidence an employee could use to reveal that an employer’s 
legitimate excuse was really a pretext for discrimination: “facts as to the petitioner’s treatment of 
respondent during his prior term of employment; petitioner’s reaction, if any, to respondent’s 
legitimate civil rights activities; and petitioner’s general policy and practice with respect to 
minority employment.”  Id. at 804-05. 
 29. Id. at 804; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 516 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). 
 30. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 516 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).  See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 457 (1982) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
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The Supreme Court first addressed the theory of disparate impact—
unintentional discrimination—in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., when it stated that 
Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are 
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”32  Disparate impact focuses on 
the effect of policies implemented by employers, and the greater “impact” that 
facially neutral policies may have on groups protected by Title VII as 
compared to the effect and impact policies may have on non-protected 
groups.33  The Court’s goal in Griggs was to adhere to the provisions in the 
statutes promulgated by Congress in its enactment of Title VII.34  “Under the 
Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in 
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo 
of prior discriminatory employment practices.”35  While “the Act does not 
command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject 
of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group,”36 it does 
require “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis 
of racial or other impermissible classification.”37  The Court points out, 
however, that if the questionable classification or test can be legitimately and 
rationally based on a business need of the employer, then the act will be 
 
 32. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  In Griggs, the Supreme Court 
held that an employer’s requirements of a high school diploma or achievement of “satisfactory 
scores on two professionally prepared aptitude tests” to qualify for a promotion to the company’s 
different departments discriminated against the employee-plaintiffs, African-American men.  Id. 
at 427-28. 
 33. See id. at  424.  See also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 
(1977); Teal, 457 U.S. 440.  See generally Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 
(1988); Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 34. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30. 
 35. Id. at 430.  The employer in Griggs relied in part upon Section 703(h) of Title VII, 
which allowed for nondiscriminatory employment tests: 
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to give and act upon the results of any 
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action 
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000). 
 36. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at 431.  The Griggs court noted that the high school completion and professional 
aptitude test requirements were discriminatory against African-American employees because they 
had “long received inferior education in segregated schools.”  Id. at 430.  Data from the employer 
revealed that “‘whites register[ed] far better on the Company’s alternative requirements’” than 
African-Americans did.  Id. at 430 (quoting Griggs v. Duke, 420 F.2d 1225, 1239 n.60 (4th Cir. 
1970)).  What made the “alternative requirements” ultimately discriminatory, however, was the 
determination that “neither the high school completion requirement nor the general intelligence 
test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which 
it was used.”  Id. at 431. 
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tolerated.38  “The touchstone is business necessity.  If an employment practice 
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.”39 
Over time, the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in disparate 
impact cases would eventually make it more difficult for an employee-plaintiff 
to succeed.  First, the Court increased the plaintiff’s prima facie burden,40 and, 
second, the Court included in the plaintiff’s prima facie burden the requirement 
of invalidating a business necessity defense asserted by the employer.41  The 
plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie in a Title VII disparate impact 
claim was complicated as the Court decided that something more than 
statistical evidence of a discriminatory effect is required for a plaintiff to meet 
this burden.42 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust set forth the initial evidentiary 
framework for disparate impact cases.43  First, it is the burden of the plaintiff to 
identify a particular employment practice that is effecting a discriminatory 
impact on a protected class of employees.44  Next, “causation must be proved; 
that is, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree 
sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of 
applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected 
group.”45  The defendant then has the opportunity to challenge the statistics set 
forth by the plaintiff.46  “‘If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in 
the data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing evidence of 
his own.’”47  The employer may also buttress his position by showing that the 
employment action causing the discriminatory effect is justified by “business 
necessity,” though the “ultimate burden” of proof “remains with the plaintiff at 
all times.”48  Once the employer meets this burden, however, the plaintiff can 
counter by “‘show[ing] that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly 
 
 38. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. 
 39. Id. at 431.  In Griggs, the thing that made the “alternative requirements” ultimately 
discriminatory, however, was the Court’s determination from the evidence that “neither the high 
school completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable 
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.”  Id. 
 40. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
 41. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 42. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 991-94. 
 43. See generally id. 
 44. Id. at 994.  The Watson court focused this point particularly on subjective employment 
practices versus objective employment practices.  One major objective of Watson was to 
determine if subjective practices would be applicable to a disparate impact critique; the Court 
held that they would.  Id. at 1010-11. 
 45. Id. at 994. 
 46. Watson, 487 U.S. at 996. 
 47. Id. at 996 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977)). 
 48. Id. at 997. 
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undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate 
interest . . . .’”49 
The Supreme Court discussed the heightened statistical requirement of the 
plaintiff’s burden in Watson: “[T]he plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima 
facie case goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities in 
the employer’s work force.”50  Watson also elaborated upon the reasoning 
behind requiring more than statistical evidence in plaintiff’s prima facie 
burden: 
Respondent insists, and the United States agrees, that employers’ only 
alternative will be to adopt surreptitious quota systems in order to ensure that 
no plaintiff can establish a statistical prima facie case. 
  We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases 
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic 
measures. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . Preferential treatment and the use of quotas by public employers 
subject to Title VII can violate the Constitution, and it has long been 
recognized that the legal rules leaving any class of employers with “little 
choice” but to adopt such measures would be “far from the intent of Title 
VII.”51 
The “business necessity” component of disparate impact, as the most 
convenient way to establish a defense to practices causing discriminatory 
effects, was greatly utilized by employers, and its parameters were, over time, 
stretched by the Court ultimately to make it quite difficult for employees to 
succeed in Title VII disparate impact claims.  The Supreme Court reached its 
limit, however, in Wards Cove Packing Co.  v. Atonio.52  In Wards Cove, the 
Court reiterated the plaintiff’s prima facie requirements stated in Watson.  
Particularly, the Court required a showing of “a specific or particular 
employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack.”  It 
also required that the plaintiff meet a “specific causation requirement.”53  To 
achieve this, the plaintiff was instructed to use employment ‘“records or other 
information which will disclose the impact which its tests and other selection 
procedures have upon employment opportunities of persons by identifiable 
 
 49. Id. at 998 (quoting Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). 
 50. Id. at 994. 
 51. Watson, 487 U.S. at 992-93 (citations omitted). 
 52. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 53. Id. at 657. 
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race, sex, or ethnic group[s]’”54 to show  “a causal link between challenged 
employment practices and racial imbalances in the work force.”55 
Wards Cove departed from prior holdings in its discussion of the business 
necessity defense.  Though “the employer carries the burden of producing 
evidence of a business justification for his employment practice. . . . The 
burden of persuasion . . . remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff.”56  The 
plaintiff’s burden does not end after the plaintiff “established a prima facie 
case of disparate impact.”57  On the contrary, the plaintiff would still retain the 
burden to persuade the trier of fact that the business justification stated by the 
defendant was “insubstantial.”58  This was akin to the plaintiff’s burden in a 
disparate treatment case to persuade the trier of fact that an employer’s 
legitimate reason was a pretext to discrimination,59 but in the context of 
disparate impact jurisprudence, it was a new and troubling standard for 
employees. 
Finally, Wards Cove altered the prong of disparate impact allowing a 
plaintiff to prevail with a showing of a suitable alternative to the business 
practice effecting a discriminatory impact.  Instead of this “alternative” 
showing allowing a plaintiff to prevail under the disparate impact theory, the 
Wards Cove court used this alternative showing instead to detect and prove 
that a business practice was really a “‘pretext’ for discrimination,” as one 
would find in a disparate treatment action.60  In this way, Wards Cove appeared 
to blur the lines between the frameworks of disparate treatment and disparate 
impact, two closely related, but quite distinct concepts. 
The 1991 Civil Rights Act addressed the theory of disparate impact that 
had evolved in the courts and culminated in Wards Cove in 1989.  Particularly, 
Congress intended to clarify the original disparate impact theory set forth in 
Griggs, from which the courts had departed in many ways, resulting in making 
it more difficult for Title VII claimants to state a valid claim under the 
disparate impact theory.61  To achieve this, the 1991 Civil Rights Act codified 
the prima facie requirements for a showing of disparate impact in violation of 
Title VII.  This amendment states that: 
 
 54. Id. at 658 (quoting Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 
1607.4(A) (1988)) (alteration in original). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 659. 
 57. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659. 
 58. Id. at 659-60 
 59. See id. at 660. 
 60. Id. at 660 (quoting Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). 
 61. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 1991 WL 
87020, at *2 (West 2002).  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 sought to address Supreme Court 
decisions that placed more difficulties on the claimants suing under Title VII disparate impact 
claims.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (I) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 1991 
WL 70454 (West 2002). 
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(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established under this subchapter only if— 
(1) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent 
with business necessity. . . .62 
The statute also mandates that “business necessity may not be used as a 
defense against a claim of intentional discrimination”63 and that any 
employment decision premised on “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin” is “an unlawful employment practice  . . . even though other factors 
also motivated the practice.”64 
III.  TITLE VII AND PRE-PDA CASE LAW 
Though Title VII sex discrimination is discussed in many cases, there is 
barely a mention of the topic in the statute’s legislative history.65  For example, 
nothing in the Senate Report or the House of Representatives Report preceding 
the adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act discussed or explained the protected 
class of “sex.”66  The reports showed that the Congressional focus for the 1964 
Civil Rights Act was primarily, if not solely, on race.67  As a result of this 
absence of explanatory materials about “sex,” in some instances prior to 1978, 
the courts misconstrued the intent of Congress in including “sex 
 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2000). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
 65. 88 CONG. REC. H2577 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep. Smith).  See, e.g., 
Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1965-66); Jo 
Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 
LAW & INEQ. 163 (1991).  See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268-69 
(W.D. Wash. 2001).  It is a widely disputed anecdote of American history.  Some scholars believe 
that the inclusion of “sex” in Title VII legislation was not an original intention of its sponsors, but 
was a roundabout occurrence and even perhaps the result of a backfiring of a conservative 
congressman’s tactic in arguing his point.  The point is, however, that “sex” was added as an 
eleventh-hour attempt by a conservative lawmaker to convince his colleagues of the 
ridiculousness Title VII as a whole by illustrating such ridiculousness through the addition of 
“sex.”  The senator’s attempt backfired, and “sex” was included in Title VII as a legitimate 
category of prohibited discrimination.  Due to this apparently unplanned inclusion of “sex” in 
Title VII, the legislative history of discussions and debates of sex discrimination are sparse to say 
the least.  See also Megan Colleen Roth, Note, Rocking the Cradle with Erickson v. Bartell Drug 
Co.: Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Takes a Step Forward, 70 UMKC L. REV. 781, 783 
(2002). 
 66. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 1963 WL 
4735; S. REP.  NO. 88-872 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 1964 WL 4755. 
 67. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964); S. REP. NO. 88-872 (1964). 
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discrimination” in Title VII.  The most prevalent example of this was the 1976 
Supreme Court case of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.68  In response to the 
courts’ handling69 of Title VII sex discrimination cases, and particularly in 
response to Gilbert,70 Congress addressed this discrepancy by amending and 
explicating Title VII sex discrimination with subsequent legislation, namely 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) in 1978.71 
Gilbert prompted Congress to restate and clarify its intent in including “sex 
discrimination” within Title VII twelve years earlier, particularly in the context 
of pregnancy.72  In Gilbert, the Supreme Court, disagreeing with “eighteen 
federal district courts and all seven federal courts of appeals”73 that had 
previously grappled with this question,74 held that an employer’s “disability-
benefits plan [did] not violate Title VII because of its failure to cover 
pregnancy-related disabilities.”75  In other words, to the Gilbert court, a 
comprehensive plan excluding coverage for pregnancy, a condition felt only by 
women, did not discriminate against women.  Under Gilbert, the condition of 
pregnancy did not equate to sex, and refusing to cover pregnancy in a 
comprehensive disability insurance plan did not equate to refusing to cover 
women in general.  “The Court concluded that this exclusion in the company’s 
benefits policy was not gender-related but condition-related” and “[b]ecause 
the plan did not exclude any disability that could be incurred by both men and 
women, it was not discriminatory.”76  To explain and illustrate its holding, the 
Supreme Court in Gilbert aligned its analysis with a case it handled two years 
prior, Geduldig v. Aiello.77 
The issue contemplated in Geduldig was based on a disability insurance 
system administered by the State of California and funded by private 
 
 68. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 69. And apparent mishandling, at least from Congress’ perspective. 
 70. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 1978 WL 8570, at 
*2 (West 2001). 
 71. Id.; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983); 
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 72. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125. 
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at *2. 
 74. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 147.  Gilbert cited six of these appellate court holdings: 
Communications Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th 
Cir. 1975); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 
850 (6th Cir. 1975); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d. 961 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 75. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46. 
 76. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at *2. 
 77. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).  Though nearly thirty years old, Geduldig is 
still relevant in current law topics.  See generally Shannon E. Liss, The Constitutionality of 
Pregnancy Discrimination: The Lingering Effects of Geduldig and Suggestions for Forcing Its 
Reversal, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59 (1997). 
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employees to benefit those employees when they became temporarily unable to 
work due to disabilities that were not covered by worker’s compensation.78  
Particularly at issue was the plan’s refusal to cover costs for disabilities 
associated with normal pregnancy and childbirth.79  The Geduldig court held 
that the decisions made by the California insurance plan did not “amount[] to 
invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause” and further stated 
that  “California does not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups 
which are eligible for disability insurance protection under the program.”80  An 
important element to the Geduldig decision was the cost-factor of this state-
sponsored welfare program; the Supreme Court had previously addressed this 
element. 
[A] State “may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . .  The legislature 
may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting 
others. . . .”  Particularly with respect to social welfare programs, so long as the 
line drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose 
their judgment as to the appropriate stopping point.  “[T]he Equal Protection 
Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every 
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.”81 
Therefore, since the employee had received coverage under the California plan 
that was no different from anyone else covered by the plan (meaning that all 
women with normal pregnancies were denied coverage, not just the appellee-
employee), the Geduldig court concluded that the act of exempting coverage 
for all normal pregnancies was not discriminatory towards the employee.82 
What the Geduldig court saw in Aiello’s claim was the simplified assertion 
that she had “suffered discrimination because she encountered a risk that was 
outside the program’s protection,” and this was a claim that was “not . . . 
valid . . . under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”83  
Furthermore, Geduldig contended that there was no evidence that 
 
 78. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 486. 
 79. Id.  It is interesting to note that three of the original four plaintiffs in this action had 
arguments that were deemed moot by the Supreme Court.  Just ten days prior to this holding, the 
case of Rentzer v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1973), held that the statute should apply only to pregnancies with abnormal 
complications.  In other words, normal pregnancies could be excluded from the plan coverage.  
As a result, the three other plaintiffs in Geduldig, who each had complications during pregnancy, 
all of which resulting in either termination of the pregnancy or miscarriage, received coverage 
under the plan, leaving the sole appellee with the normal pregnancy.  Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 489. 
 80. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494. 
 81. Id. at 495 (omissions in original) (citations omitted). 
 82. See id. at 496-97. 
 83. Id. at 497. 
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the selection of the risks insured by the program worked to discriminate 
against any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection 
derived by that group or class from the program.  There is no risk from which 
men are protected and women are not.  Likewise, there is no risk from which 
women are protected and men are not.84 
Boiled down to the bottom line, this reasoning from Geduldig separated the 
beneficiaries of the California plan into two groups: pregnant women, who 
were refused coverage, and nonpregnant persons, who were not refused 
coverage.85  The discriminatory effect of this division (that was ignored as “sex 
discrimination” by both Geduldig and Gilbert on a “condition-based” coverage 
theory) was that the only sex that could be omitted from coverage for 
pregnancy, of course, was women. 
Though Geduldig constitutionally justified the refusal of coverage for 
normal pregnancy-related disabilities under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court saw it fit for comparison with 
Gilbert, which was based instead on Title VII sex discrimination.86  The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that was relied upon in 
Geduldig, states that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”87  
The Title VII language applicable in Gilbert stated that “it shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”88  The Supreme Court aligned Gilbert with Geduldig based on its 
belief that the Equal Protection Clause could be utilized “as a useful starting 
point” to interpret the definition of the term “discrimination” as used in Title 
VII.89  The Court, in Gilbert, explained why the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Title VII should be read together: 
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this language, 
intended to incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which 
have evolved from court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the similarities between the congressional 
language and some of those decisions surely indicate that the latter are a useful 
starting point in interpreting the former.  Particularly in the case of defining the 
term “discrimination,” which Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined, those 
cases afford an existing body of law analyzing and discussing that term in a 
 
 84. Id. at 496-97. 
 85. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
 86. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976). 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1) (2000). 
 89. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133. 
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legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress manifested 
in enacting Title VII.90 
The Equal Protection Clause and Title VII share the similar goals of promoting 
equality, by requiring equal protection of the laws in the former, and by 
requiring equal treatment of employees in the latter.  This seems to suggest, 
then, that the equality in employment that is demanded by Title VII is also tied 
to the idea that one can avoid committing the act of discriminating by applying 
equal treatment to all persons.91 
Similar law was not the only characteristic the Supreme Court felt Gilbert 
shared with Geduldig; more striking was the similar issue of an employment-
associated92 health care benefits plan withholding coverage for disabilities that 
stemmed from pregnancy.  The plan disputed in Gilbert was offered by the 
employer, General Electric Company (General Electric) as a part of the 
company’s “total compensation package.”93  This package provided 
“nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all employees under its 
Weekly Sickness and Accident Insurance Plan . . . in an amount equal to 60% 
of an employee’s normal straight-time weekly earnings.”94  Though General 
Electric’s plan made payments “to employees who [became] totally disabled as 
a result of a nonoccupational sickness or accident,”95 it repeatedly refused to 
“provide disability-benefit payments for any absence due to pregnancy.”96 
The Eastern District of Virginia, while handling General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert,  found that “normal pregnancy, while not necessarily either a ‘disease’ 
or an ‘accident,’ was disabling for a period of six to eight weeks.”97  
Accordingly, it found that General Electric “discriminated on the basis of sex 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. For a more complete discussion on the connection between the Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14th Amendment and Title VII, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973), 
which, in regards to discriminatory statutes stated, “any statutory scheme which draws a sharp 
line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, 
necessarily commands ‘dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated,’ 
and therefore involves the ‘very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the 
[Constitution].’”  Id. at 690 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (omission in 
original).  It appears that the Gilbert court applied this principle to employers acting in a 
discriminatory nature, and not just to discriminatory actions of governments. 
 92. This distinction is made because the plan in Geduldig was funded by private employees 
and administered by the State of California for coverage of privately employed persons, while the 
Gilbert plan was a part of the compensation  package that General Electric provided for its 
employees. 
 93. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 129. 
 97. Id. at 130 (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D. Va. 1974)). 
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in the operation of its disability program in violation of Title VII.”98  On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, affirmed the 
District Court by a divided vote, deciding that Geduldig should not apply since 
it concerned the Equal Protection Clause and not Title VII.99 
The Supreme Court, however, saw the Gilbert controversy in a different 
light and disagreed with the Fourth Circuit determination that Geduldig did not 
apply: 
Since it is a finding of sex-based discrimination that must trigger, in a case 
such as this, the finding of an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII], 
Geduldig is precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy 
from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-
based discrimination at all.100 
Despite the different law applied in Gilbert and Geduldig, the Supreme Court 
felt that neither claimant had “attempted to meet the burden of demonstrating a 
gender-based discriminatory effect resulting from the exclusion of pregnancy-
related disabilities from coverage.”101  The “burden” that the claimant in 
Gilbert was required to meet constituted a showing of a prima facie violation 
of Title VII; thus, the plaintiff in Gilbert failed to make the requisite initial 
showing under Title VII of an inference of sex discrimination.102 
A. Disparate Treatment in the Context of Gilbert  
Gilbert addressed the questions of whether an insurance plan that targeted 
pregnancy, a condition vested solely upon women, discriminated against 
women, either intentionally, through disparate treatment, or unintentionally, 
through a disparate impact on women in violation of Title VII.103  The Court 
handled the initial question of disparate treatment easily, as much of its 
discussion of whether discrimination had occurred worked to rely upon, and 
replicate, the kind of reasoning it had used previously in Geduldig,104 rather 
than performing an independent analysis of the facts of Gilbert in the disparate 
treatment framework established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.105  First, the 
Court examined the statute to determine whether General Electric 
“discriminate[d] against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
 
 98. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 132 (citing Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 385-86). 
 99. Id. at 132; Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co. 519 F.2d 661, 666 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 100. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136. 
 101. Id. at 137. 
 102. Id. at 136-37.  See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text. 
 103. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137. 
 104. See id. at 132-36. 
 105. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  See also supra notes 
15-31 and accompanying text. 
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”106  The Court found that the 
plaintiff-employee failed to meet her prima facie burden.  “Since gender-based 
discrimination had not been shown to exist either by the terms of the plan or by 
its effect, there was no need to reach the question of what sort of standard 
would govern our review had there been such a showing.”107 
In further support of its decision, the Court turned to its prior holding in 
Geduldig “that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits plan 
providing general coverage is not a gender-based [sic] discrimination at all” 
and found that it was directly on point with Gilbert.  Again, the Court aligned 
the two cases despite Geduldig’s sole basis on the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Gilbert’s foundation of Title VII.  This 
alignment was justified by the Court because cases based on either Title VII or 
the Equal Protection Clause dealt with the “concepts of discrimination,” and 
because the policies of insurance at play in Geduldig and Gilbert, as well as the 
operation of each program, were quite similar:108 
Since it is a finding of sex-based discrimination that must trigger, in a case 
such as this, the finding of an unlawful employment practice under § 703(a)(1), 
Geduldig is precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy 
from a disability benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-
based discrimination at all.109 
Therefore, the Supreme Court felt that neither of these plans discriminated 
against women. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that, as in Geduldig, General 
Electric’s exclusions were not “pretexts designed to effect an invidious 
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.”110  In Geduldig, 
the Gilbert court noted, this “pretext” question was framed in different terms: 
“[A] distinction which on its face is not sex related might nonetheless violate 
the Equal Protection Clause if it were in fact a subterfuge to accomplish a 
forbidden discrimination.”111  The Court believed that General Electric’s 
exclusion of pregnancy-related disability coverage did not impermissively 
discriminate against women, though the Court noted that the condition was 
“confined to women,”112 because it was “different from the typical covered 
 
 106. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). 
 107. Id. at 135. 
 108. Id. at 133-34. 
 109. Id. at 136. 
 110. Id.  (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 519 F.2d 661, 666 (4th Cir. 1975)).  This point was originally made by the Supreme Court in 
Geduldig, and was brought up again by the Supreme Court in Gilbert in response to the Fourth 
Circuit in Gilbert. 
 111. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136. 
 112. Id. 
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disease or disability.”113  “[Pregnancy] is not a ‘disease’ at all, and is often a 
voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.”114  For these reasons, the Court 
chose not to view General Electric’s “exclusion of pregnancy disability 
benefits”115 as a “simple pretext for discriminating against women”116 and 
held, accordingly, that the employee did not prove disparate treatment in 
violation of Title VII.117 
B. Disparate Impact in the Context of Gilbert 
Under the disparate impact theory of Title VII, the Gilbert Court required 
“proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or classification is to 
discriminate against members of one class or another.”118  The standard used 
by Gilbert was, from Griggs, whether “even absent proof of intent, the 
consequences of the [plan] were ‘invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
racial or other impermissible classification.’”119  The Court determined that the 
prima facie standard for disparate impact had not been fulfilled by the 
claimant, relying on the fact that the District Court neither found, nor had 
sufficient evidence to find, “that the financial benefits of the Plan ‘worked to 
discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk 
protection derived by that group or class from the program.’”120  Since the 
claimant in Gilbert failed to fulfill the prima facie standard for disparate 
impact, the Court held that there was no violation of Title VII under the 
disparate impact theory.121 
The Court’s conclusion was based on its belief that not all women 
employed by General Electric would become pregnant and utilize pregnancy 
benefits, thereby justifying its interpretation of “pregnancy related disabilities” 
as “additional risk[s].” Echoing its analysis in Geduldig, Gilbert described the 
insurance plan as “nothing more than an insurance package, which covers 
some risks, but excludes others,”122 adding that a disability plan’s 
“underinclusion” of risks, or lack of comprehensiveness will not bring about 
Title VII violation.123  The Court permitted this exclusion because it was an 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (citing Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 375, 377 (E.D. Va. 1974)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136. 
 117. Id. at 137. 
 118. Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-248 (1976)). 
 119. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
 120. Id. at 138 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 471 U.S. 484, 496 (1974)). 
 121. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137. 
 122. Id. at 138 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494). 
 123. Id. 
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“additional risk,”124 that happened to vest itself on some women, and therefore 
it was lawful to exclude it from the disability plan: 
For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, 
unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not 
destroy the presumed parity of the benefits accruing to men and women alike, 
which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of the risks.125 
General Electric did not simply remove coverage from its women employees 
that its male employees received, as that most certainly would have constituted 
sex discrimination under Title VII in 1976.126  General Electric employees—
men and women—did receive the coverage for “exactly the same categories of 
risk.”127  Rather, the exclusion was a cost-controlling decision that did not 
remove from women benefits received by men, but instead removed benefits 
from women that men did not also utilize,128 thereby justifying the exclusion in 
the eyes of 1976 Title VII jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court’s conclusion in Gilbert meant that an otherwise 
comprehensive plan that deliberately excluded pregnancy coverage was, in the 
Court’s eyes, facially neutral and without a discriminatory effect on women.  
In essence, the Court did not equate “pregnancy” with “sex”; under Title VII in 
1976 the Court found that discrimination based on pregnancy was not the same 
thing as discrimination based on sex.  This disparity was corrected by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII in 1978. 
 
 124. Id. at 139. 
 125. Id. 
 126. One example this author can think of is coverage for disabilities associated with heart 
attacks.  Since both men and women have heart attacks, a health insurance policy that covered 
heart attacks for men but not women would be clearly in violation of Title VII.  Here, however, 
since the condition of pregnancy does not happen to men, it is considered an “additional risk.” 
 127. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138. 
 128. See id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Interestingly, the majority seems to suggest that 
the coverage was exactly the same for male and female employees of General Electric, meaning 
that excluding exclusively-female health care needs such as pregnancy was justified by the fact 
that exclusively male health care needs were also excluded by the plan.  The Gilbert majority 
stated that “[General Electric’s benefits plan] covers exactly the same categories of risk, and is 
facially nondiscriminatory in the sense that ‘[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and 
women are not . . . . [and] no risk from which women are protected and men are not.’”  Id. at 138 
(quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)) (second alteration in original).  In fact, 
there was coverage provided for exclusively-male needs, particularly “risks such as 
prostatectomies, vasectomies, and circumcisions.”  Id. 
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III.  THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 
A. The Dissent of Gilbert: A Foundation for the PDA 
Rather than understanding the different sex-based health care needs of 
women and men, the Gilbert court looked instead to a “common denominator” 
of coverage needs: all men and women would be covered for the same 
conditions.  Since male employees did not get pregnant, General Electric’s 
refusal to cover disabilities related to the condition of pregnancy was not 
discriminatory towards women.  Instead, Gilbert deemed pregnancy-related 
disabilities “‘extra’ disabilities”129 that were mere “additional risk[s]”130 
occurring outside of General Electric’s disability benefits plan.  Gilbert 
believed that “it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in 
this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not 
receive benefits; . . . gender-based discrimination does not result simply 
because an employer’s disability-benefits plan is less than all-inclusive.”131  
General Electric’s benefits exclusion did not affect all women employees 
(since not all women were pregnant), thereby assuming two things: first, that 
for a group to be discriminated against, it must be a “uniform 
discrimination,”132 and second, that “pregnant women” did not constitute a 
class protected under Title VII.  These assumptions were taken up in the 
dissent of Gilbert as well as the PDA.  The Gilbert majority was rebutted by 
the strong dissent of Justice Brennan, and even more importantly, by the 
Congressional amendment to the Title VII provision for sex discrimination via 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. 
The dissent of Justice Brennan in Gilbert, in which Justice Marshall 
concurred, interpreted the applicability of Title VII to General Electric’s 
disability plan exclusion in a much different manner.  The disparity, Justice 
Brennan noted, between the majority and his dissent133 hinged largely on the 
“conceptual framework” that each side used to analyze the question.  The two 
sides differed on whether General Electric’s plan concerned “a gender-free 
assignment of risks,”134 or something more, an omission of coverage that was 
propelled by an intent to discriminate, and that carried with it a discriminatory 
effect.135  Initially the dissent rejected the majority’s decision since the six 
 
 129. Id. at 139 n.17. 
 130. Id. at 139. 
 131. Id. at 138-39. 
 132. This means that Title VII sex discrimination would only occur if the employer 
discriminated against all female employees.  In Gilbert, however, General Electric’s disability 
plan only discriminated against pregnant women.  429 U.S. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 133. The majority, again, also departed from the stances of the lower courts of Gilbert, the 
women plaintiffs and the EEOC. 
 134. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 147. 
 135. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
484 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:463 
appellate courts dealing with the same issue had “unanimous[ly] conclu[ded]” 
that the type of disability benefits plan exclusion utilized by General Electric 
violated Title VII.136  Furthermore, Brennan’s dissent took issue with the 
majority’s “repudiat[ion] [of] the applicable administrative guideline 
promulgated by the agency charged by Congress with implementation of the 
Act,” the EEOC.137 
Brennan’s dissent began by comparing the EEOC’s argument in its brief as 
amicus curiae with the response of the majority.  The EEOC believed that 
General Electric’s disability plan violated Title VII “because the omission of 
pregnancy from the program ha[d] the intent and effect of providing that ‘only 
women [were subjected] to a substantial risk of total loss of income because of 
temporary medical disability.’”138  The majority, on the other hand, felt that 
Title VII had not been violated because “it view[ed] General Electric’s plan as 
representing a gender-free assignment of risks in accordance with normal 
actuarial techniques.”139  Also, to counter the EEOC’s interpretation of the 
purpose of Title VII, the majority wrote extensively about the proper place of 
the EEOC decisions in the context of statutory interpretation, particularly that: 
[I]n enacting Title VII, [Congress] did not confer upon the EEOC authority to 
promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that Title.  This does not mean that 
EEOC guidelines are not entitled to consideration in determining legislative 
intent.  But it does mean that the courts properly may accord less weight to 
such guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared 
shall have the force of law.140 
In response to this, Justice Brennan concluded that the correctness of the 
Court’s opinion, and the determination of the proper “conceptual framework” 
through which to interpret Title VII rested in a two-fold analysis.  First, Justice 
Brennan addressed the “soundness of the Court’s underlying assumption that 
the plan is the untainted product of a gender-neutral risk assignment 
process.”141  He concluded that this assumption, based on the “historical 
backdrop of General Electric’s employment practices,”142 as well as “the 
existence or nonexistence of gender-free policies governing the inclusion of 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 146-47. 
 138. Id. at 147 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
at 12, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (No. 74-1589)). 
 139. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 at 147. 
 140. Id. at 141 (citations omitted).  A large part of Gilbert’s majority opinion and Brennan’s 
dissent was devoted to the EEOC’s position and its guidelines in Gilbert.  The majority and 
dissent disagreed on the extent to which the EEOC decisions and guidelines should have shaped 
and influenced the Court when answering this question.  While this was significant in Gilbert, it 
played less of a role in Erickson. 
 141. Id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. 
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compensable risks,”143 was “purely fanciful.”144  Second, Justice Brennan 
addressed the question of whether “the resulting pattern of risks insured by 
General Electric can then be evaluated in terms of the broad social objectives 
promoted by Title VII.”145  By viewing Gilbert in terms of whether it satisfied 
the goals of Title VII, Brennan concluded that “the EEOC’s interpretation that 
the exclusion of pregnancy from a disability insurance plan is incompatible 
with the overall objectives of Title VII has been unjustifiably rejected.”146 
Getting to the core of the issue, Justice Brennan’s dissent examined the 
acts of General Electric in the contexts of disparate treatment and disparate 
impact under Title VII.  First, under disparate treatment, Justice Brennan 
criticized the majority’s reliance on Geduldig, commenting that Geduldig 
could apply to Gilbert only in its determination “that a pregnancy classification 
standing alone cannot be said to fall into the category of classifications that rest 
explicitly on ‘gender as such.’”147  The dissent remarked that “it offend[ed] 
common sense to suggest . . . that a classification revolving around pregnancy 
is not, at the minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’”148  In addition, Justice Brennan 
looked to the central question in Geduldig, which was “whether the exclusion 
of a sex-linked disability . . . was actually a product of neutral, persuasive 
actuarial considerations, or rather stemmed from a policy that purposefully 
downgraded women’s role in the labor force.”149  In Geduldig, Justice Brennan 
noted that, since the defendant was the State of California, it received “the 
normal presumption favoring legislative action” in Equal Protection Clause 
challenges.150  However, first, in Gilbert, the defendant was a private company 
being sued under Title VII, not a state being challenged under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.151  Second: 
[T]he Court simply disregards a history of General Electric practices that have 
served to undercut the employment opportunities of women who become 
pregnant while employed.  Moreover, the Court studiously ignores the 
undisturbed conclusion of the District Court that General Electric’s 
“discriminatory attitude” toward women was a “motivating factor in its 
policy,” and that the pregnancy exclusion was “neutral (neither) on its face” 
nor “in its intent.”152 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 at 148. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 148-49. 
 148. Id. at 149. 
 149. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149. 
 150. Id. (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted). 
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Justice Brennan also criticized the decision of the majority based on the 
assertion that pregnancy differs from other disabilities due to its “voluntary” 
nature.153  The district court found that pregnancy was “often a voluntarily 
undertaken and desired condition,” to which the majority felt marked a 
distinction between pregnancy and the other disabilities covered in General 
Electric’s plan.154  Justice Brennan, however, felt that the “voluntary” 
distinction was not persuasive, “for as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, 
‘other than for childbirth disability, [General Electric] had never construed its 
plan as eliminating all so-called “voluntary” disabilities,’ including sport 
injuries, attempted suicides, venereal disease, disabilities incurred in the 
commission of a crime or during a fight, and elective cosmetic surgery.”155  
While not devoting a large portion of its opinion to this concept, the Court felt 
that this was another reason General Electric’s exclusion was not a “pretext for 
discriminating against women.”156  Interestingly, this same argument was also 
asserted by the defendant in Erickson and was rejected by the court.157 
Justice Brennan then utilized the “framework” explicated in Geduldig to 
counter the Court’s arguments in Gilbert.  The Geduldig court stated that 
“‘[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not . . . [and] 
no risk from which women are protected and men are not.’”158  As Justice 
Brennan pointed out, however, General Electric’s disability plan covered risks 
such as “prostatectomies, vasectomies, and circumcisions that are specific to 
the reproductive system of men and for which there exist no female 
counterparts covered by the plan.”159  This left pregnancy to be “the only 
disability, sex-specific or otherwise, that is excluded from coverage.”160  This 
finding prompted Brennan to suggest that the Court’s belief that the plan was 
based on “a mere underinclusive assignment of risks in a sex-neutral 
fashion”161 as being “simplistic and misleading.”162  Ultimately, Brennan 
agreed with the District Court’s holding that “General Electric’s 
‘discriminatory attitude’ toward women was ‘a motivating factor in its 
policy’163 and that the pregnancy exclusion was ‘neutral neither on its face’ nor 
 
 153. Id. at 151. 
 154. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136 (citing Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D. 
Va. 1974)). 
 155. Id. at 151 (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 665 (4th Cir. 1975)). 
 156. Id. at 136. 
 157. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272-73 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 158. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 152 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 150 (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 383 (E.D. 
Va. 1974)) (citation omitted). 
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‘in its intent.’”164  Clearly, to Justice Brennan, General Electric had 
discriminated against its female employees under the disparate treatment 
theory of Title VII. 
Justice Brennan then analyzed the Court’s decision under the disparate 
impact theory.  He particularly urged the Court to apply the legal theory of 
disparate impact in violation of Title VII that each of the appellate courts had 
previously applied when dealing with this issue: that “a prima facie violation 
of Title VII . . . [could be] established by demonstrating that a facially neutral 
classification has the effect of discriminating against members of a defined 
class.”165  Justice Brennan noted three distinct discriminatory effects of 
General Electric’s coverage exclusion: (1) “the plan covers all disabilities that 
mutually afflict both sexes;”166 (2) the plan insures against all disabilities that 
are male-specific or have a predominant impact on males;”167 and (3) “all 
female-specific and female-impacted disabilities are covered, except for the 
most prevalent, pregnancy.”168  Brennan then concluded that the Court 
incorrectly focused on only the first effect of General Electric’s plan, while the 
EEOC aimed to prevent “the unequal exclusion manifested in effects two and 
three,” which represented a disparate impact on women in violation of Title 
VII.169 
This disparity between the Court and its dissenting justices over which 
discriminatory effects were to be recognized led Brennan and Marshall to 
depart from their majority counterparts.  Brennan and Marshall believed that it 
was well-settled law170 that “a prima facie violation of Title VII, whether under 
[theories of disparate treatment or disparate impact], also is established by 
demonstrating that a facially neutral classification has the effect of 
discriminating against members of a defined class.”171  The dissent arguments 
provided a helpful framework not only for the PDA, but also cases following 
it, including Erickson. 
 
 164. Id. (quoting Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 382). 
 165. Id. at 155. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155. 
 169. Id.  In Gilbert, Justice Brennan also discussed the reasons why the EEOC regulations 
should be followed.  Id. at 155-59. 
 170. Id. at 154.  Brennan felt that it was particularly well settled due to the findings of the six 
appellate courts, which accepted a position opposite to the majority’s. 
 171. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
488 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:463 
B. A Legislative Response: The PDA Amendment to Title VII 
In a direct response to the Supreme Court holding in Gilbert,172 Congress 
decided it was time to clarify what the Title VII prohibition against sex 
discrimination was meant to do173 and redefined the scope of the law by re-
defining “sex discrimination” in Title VII.174  The PDA added the following 
language to Title VII: 
(k) The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other 
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .175 
Unlike the absence of legislative history elaborating on the scope and 
proper application of sex discrimination under the 1964 version of Title VII,176 
the PDA did have accompanying legislative history to explain the 
Congressional intent and purpose for adopting the law.  A large part of that 
history came directly from Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Gilbert.  
Congress’ purpose for the PDA was to “clarify [its] intent to include 
discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions in 
the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment.”177  The House 
Report discussing the creation of the PDA showed that the law was created not 
to “reflect [a] new legislative mandate of the Congress . . . . [but] to eradicate 
confusion by expressly broadening the definition of sex discrimination in Title 
VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination . . . [and] to clarify its original 
intent.”178  With the PDA, Congress was restating its intent behind Title VII, 
and assisting the Supreme Court to get back on track with the legislative intent 
 
 172. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 675-76 
(1983); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750. 
 173. The PDA would provide an opportunity for the 1978 Congress to show its intent for Title 
VII sex discrimination.  The intent of the 1964 Congress with regard to sex discrimination under 
Title VII is unclear, due largely to the lack of legislative history.  See supra note 65.  Congress 
felt that the Supreme Court reached the wrong result in Gilbert, and, therefore, Congress wanted 
to set the courts straight by stating its vision of prohibited sex discrimination. 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).  See also Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 678; 
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269-70 (W.D. Wash. 2001); H.R. REP. NO. 
95-948, at 1-18. 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 176. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act was created to solidify, explain and make consistent 
the judicial interpretation of the Title VII sex discrimination.  Indeed, the PDA itself does much 
to explain the intent of Title VII, and the legislative history of the PDA only helps interpreters to 
allow the law to reach its full potential.  See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750. 
 177. Id. at 1. 
 178. Id. at 3. 
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for the law.179  This tweaking of Title VII, Congress asserted, was to limit 
confusion regarding its policy on sex discrimination in the workplace and to 
prevent “an intolerable potential trend in employment practices.”180 
Part of the problem with Gilbert was the extent to which the Court needed 
to interpret “sex discrimination”—a difficult task, particularly in light of the 
lack of legislative history of “sex discrimination” in Title VII.  Accordingly, 
the PDA was created to reduce the amount of interpretation necessary in the 
courts, thereby reducing both the discretion of the courts and, as the result of 
such discretion,181 problematic holdings such as Gilbert.  This was a necessary 
clarification, because “the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretations of Title VII 
tend[ed] to erode our national policy of nondiscrimination in employment.”182 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC marked one of the 
first judicial applications of the newly adopted PDA amendment to Title 
VII.183  Prior to the PDA, Newport News’ plan provided equal coverage for 
pregnancy-related hospitalizations of female employees and spouses of male 
employees; this coverage, however, was limited in comparison to all other 
hospitalizations covered by the plan.184  After the employer made adjustments 
to its benefits plan in compliance with the PDA, female employees were 
provided coverage for their pregnancy-related hospitalizations without the 
prior limitation.185  The spouses of male employees, however, were subject to a 
limitation of coverage of 100% of reasonable and customary delivery and 
anesthesiologist charges, and $500 for the hospital stay, marking a discrepancy 
in treatment of Newport News’ female employees and the spouses of its male 
employees.186 
Newport News provided the test central to determining PDA compliance. 
“Under the proper test [Newport News’] plan is unlawful because the 
protection it affords to married male employees is less comprehensive than the 
protection it affords to married female employees.”187  This case marked the 
distinction between pre-PDA and post-PDA versions of Title VII.  The pre-
PDA holdings such as Gilbert allowed employers to refuse coverage for 
exclusively female health care needs, using a unisex definition of 
“comprehensive.”  For example, Gilbert indicated that if the same coverage 
was provided for men and women, then the coverage would not discriminate, 
 
 179. Id.; Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 676; Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. 
 180. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3. 
 181. An example of one such result is when the courts interpreted the law in ways not 
intended by Congress. 
 182. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3. 
 183. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
 184. Id. at 672. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 672-73. 
 187. Id. at 676 (emphasis added). 
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despite the different sex-based healthcare needs of men and women.  This 
“unisex” definition allowed for the “additional risk” concept of pregnancy that 
was central to Gilbert.188  Post-PDA courts would continue to recognize the 
different medical needs of women and men but recognize that, in order to 
provide comprehensive benefits to all employees, the plans would have to 
provide for sex-based healthcare needs.189 
The Supreme Court commented on the use of the “business decision” 
excuse available to employers when rebutting a presumption of discriminatory 
treatment in one post-PDA case, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.190  In Johnson 
Controls, the Court held that the policy of prohibiting women from working in 
areas of a battery manufacturing plant that could produce complications in 
their fertility and pregnancy was discriminatory under Title VII and the 
PDA.191  The employer utilized a cost-based defense, arguing that if the 
women allowed to work in these dangerous areas encountered complications in 
their fertility or future pregnancies as a result of the materials they encountered 
while working, the tort awards these women would garner would greatly 
damage the employer.192  In short, if women would be allowed to work near 
harmful materials, the resulting tort liability would make it more expensive for 
the employer to employ women.193 
The employer argued that its tort-liability would be salvaged through the 
employer’s prohibition of women working in dangerous areas.  This argument 
for a business justification warranting discrimination was rejected by the Court 
on the grounds that it violated the PDA.194  The employment policy 
specifically stated that women “capable of bearing children” would be barred 
from working in areas where they could be exposed to lead.195  “Under the 
PDA, such a classification must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the 
same light as explicit sex discrimination.  [The employer] has chosen to treat 
all of its female employees as potentially pregnant; that choice evinces 
discrimination on the basis of sex.”196  Finally, the Johnson Controls Court 
clarified that the employment policy at bar should have been analyzed under 
the disparate treatment framework and not the disparate impact theory since it 
 
 188. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 677-78 (1983). 
 190. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 191. Id. at 204-05. 
 192. Id. at 210-11. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.  Note that this determination also included consideration of “sex” as a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ), which requires certain particular defenses to it; this topic falls 
far outside the scope of this note.  For the purpose of this Note, Johnson Controls brings forth an 
example of the pre-1991 Civil Rights Act failure of a “cost” defense to disparate treatment under 
Title VII. 
 195. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198-99. 
 196. Id. 
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“[was] not neutral because it [did] not apply to the reproductive capacity of the 
company’s male employees in the same way as it applie[d] to that of the 
females.”197 
V.  THE FACTS OF ERICKSON 
When the Erickson case arose, Jennifer Erickson was twenty-six years old, 
married for one year and had just begun her career as a pharmacist at Bartell 
Drug Company.198  As a young woman just getting started in her career, she 
was not yet ready to begin having children, and she prevented pregnancy with 
the most common form of reversible birth control, oral contraceptive pills.199  
After Bartell’s employee prescription drug plan refused Erickson’s initial 
request for coverage of her oral contraceptives, she wrote to the benefits 
department requesting a change in the plan, but she was once again denied.200  
 
 197. Id.  The Court went on to recognize the premise in Title VII jurisprudence that “the 
absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral 
policy with a discriminatory effect. . . . Nor did the arguably benign motives lead to consideration 
of a business necessity defense.”  Id. at 199.  It should be noted that this use of a cost-based 
business necessity defense in a disparate treatment action in Johnson Controls pre-dated the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 that flatly prohibited this defense in this context, but for cases involving a 
bona fide occupational qualification.  See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(2) (2000). 
 198. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 9-10, Erickson (No. C00-1213L). 
 199. Kelly Dowhower Karpa, For Women Only, DRUG TOPICS, Jan. 15, 2001, at 51.  “Of U.S. 
women using contraception, 17% reportedly rely upon [oral contraceptive pills] . . . .”  Id. at 51.  
Law’s article suggests otherwise, that OCP’s are used by “twenty-seven percent of women who 
practice contraception in the United States.”  Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance  
for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 369 (1998) (citing Linda J. Piccinino & William D. 
Mosher, Trends in Contraceptive Use in the United States: 1982 – 1995, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERS. 4, 
4-5 (1998)).  Regardless of which figure is correct, the birth control pill is the choice 
contraceptive device for women trying to prevent pregnancy. 
  Ms. Erickson recently testified before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions to urge Congress to improve coverage for contraception: 
  I consider myself in many ways a typical American woman.  My husband Scott and I 
have been married for two years.  We both have full time jobs in the Seattle area and are 
working hard to save money.  We recently bought our first house and we spent a lot of 
time this summer painting and fixing it up. 
  My husband and I are both looking forward to starting a family.  However, we want 
to be adequately prepared for the financial and emotional challenges of parenting.  
Someday when we feel ready, Scott and I would like to have one or two children. 
  But we know we could not cope with having twelve to fifteen children, which is the 
average number of children women would have during their lives without access to 
contraception.  So I, like millions of other women, need and use safe, effective 
prescription contraception. 
Improving Women’s Health: Why Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Matters?: Hearing Before 
the Senate Committee on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of 
Jennifer Erickson, Class Representative, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 
(W.D. Wash. 2001)). 
 200. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 11, Erickson (No. C00-1213L). 
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Finally, after filing a charge with the EEOC in late 1999 and receiving a right-
to-sue letter, Erickson filed suit in the Western District of Washington with 
only an EEOC decision201 and a cognizable interpretation of Title VII – though 
not yet established in common law or statute – on her side.202 
Erickson did not make her claim solely for herself, but also as the class 
representative in a class action suit, the members consisting of female, non-
union Bartell employees.203  Surely she realized that this victory would have a 
much more widespread effect, warranting employers nationwide to think twice 
about their prescription plans, and leading women to once again reconsider 
their rights, their “realized” equality and their conditions in the workplace.  It 
would also prompt female employees and their employers to re-assess the 
possible discriminatory effects of their employment policies and benefit plans.  
One could imagine that, as a pharmacist, Mrs. Erickson was reminded on a 
daily basis of the effects of the injustices of discriminatory employer-based 
prescription plans for all women.  It is highly probable that Ms. Erickson 
commonly encountered patients with the same complaint that she pursued in 
Erickson.204 
The court’s holding in Erickson responded to the parties’ cross motions for 
summary judgment.  Erickson claimed that Bartell violated Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,205 as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
 
 201. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Decision on Coverage of 
Contraception, (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-
contraception.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002). 
 202. See generally id.; Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 12, Erickson (No. C00-1213L). 
 203. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 4, Erickson (No. C00-1213L). 
 204. In her testimony during a Senate hearing, Ms. Erickson commented on her perspective as 
a pharmacist on employers’ refusals to cover contraceptives: 
Personally, it was very disappointing for me [to find that my employer did not cover 
prescription contraceptives], since contraception is my most important, ongoing health 
need at this time.  For many women, it may be the only prescription she needs.  But it was 
also troubling to me professionally, as a health care provider. . . . 
  Contraception is one of the most common prescriptions I fill for women.  I am often 
the person who has the difficult job of telling a woman that her insurance plan will not 
cover contraceptives.  It is an unenviable and frustrating position to be in, because the 
woman is often upset and disappointed, and I am unable to give her an acceptable 
explanation. . . . 
  . . . . 
   I finally got tired of telling women “no this one prescription your insurance won’t 
cover.”  So I took the bold step of bringing a lawsuit against my employer to challenge its 
unfair policy.  I did it not just for me, but for the other women who work at my company 
who are not so fortunate. 
Improving Women’s Health: Why Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Matters?: Hearing Before 
the Senate Committee on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of 
Jennifer Erickson, Class Representative, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 
(W.D. Wash 2001)). 
 205. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). 
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of 1978,206 under two theories of discrimination: disparate treatment and 
disparate impact.207  Though this was a Title VII case, there was less 
discussion of the plaintiff’s prima facie burden or the framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green208 and more of an effort to justify the 
court’s alignment of Erickson with prior Supreme Court decisions on sex 
discrimination. 
Though the court in Erickson turned to prior case law instead of 
performing an independent disparate treatment analysis, Erickson’s arguments 
are important because they elucidate the employee’s position and also work 
against Bartell’s defenses to sex discrimination.  Under its theory of disparate 
treatment, or intentional discrimination, Erickson made two arguments.  First, 
she noted the disparity of coverage between preventative medications and 
treatments that were included and excluded in the prescription plan.  
Specifically, Bartell refused to cover prescription contraceptives in its 
“employee benefit plan while including benefits for other preventative medical 
services, including other preventative prescription medications and devices.”209  
Erickson then argued that Bartell’s exclusion applies only to females, because 
males did not use the contraceptive drugs and devices excluded from the plan.  
“Prescription contraception, which is available for use only by women, is basic 
medical care for women who have the potential to become pregnant but who 
wish to control that potential by reversible means.”210  In connecting these two 
arguments, Erickson concluded that “[t]he failure to provide coverage for 
prescription contraception treat[ed] medication needed for a pregnancy-related 
condition less favorably than medication needed for other medical 
conditions”211 and evidenced disparate treatment of Bartell’s female 
employees. 
Erickson’s argument under the disparate impact theory—or unintentional 
discrimination—was similar to the disparate treatment argument.  Put simply 
in the complaint, “[b]ecause prescription contraceptives are available for use 
only by women, Bartell’s failure to provide coverage for prescription 
contraception forces its female employees to choose between paying their own 
out-of-pocket prescription costs, or bearing the physical, emotional and 
financial costs of unplanned pregnancy.”212  Even if there could be shown no 
subjective intent of Bartell to discriminate against its female employees, a 
 
 206. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)).  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title 
VII to confirm that discrimination based on sex also included discrimination based on pregnancy. 
 207. Id. at 1268 n.2. 
 208. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). 
 209. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 2, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (No. C00-1213L) (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 3. 
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showing under Title VII that Bartell’s prescription plan exclusion worked to 
“limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s . . . sex,” would lead the court to find that Bartell’s prescription 
plan was discriminatory.213 
Bartell sought summary judgment in its favor on the same claims214 and 
posited numerous arguments in its defense including: 
(1) treating contraceptives differently from other prescription drugs is 
reasonable in that contraceptives are voluntary, preventative, do not 
treat or prevent an illness or disease, and are not truly a “healthcare” 
issue; 
(2) control of one’s fertility is not “pregnancy, childbirth or related 
medical conditions” as those terms are used in the PDA; 
(3) employers must be permitted to control the costs of employment 
benefits by limiting the scope of coverage; 
(4) the exclusion of all “family planning” drugs and devices is facially 
neutral; 
(5) in the thirty-seven years Title VII has been on the books, no court 
has found that excluding contraceptives constitutes sex 
discrimination; and 
(6) this issue should be determined by the legislature, rather than the 
courts.215 
The Erickson court began its discussion by retracing the legislative history 
of Title VII and the PDA.216  The court held for Erickson and against Bartell 
on the first count of disparate treatment in violation of Title VII and as a result 
did not elaborate on the plaintiff’s second claim of disparate impact or the 
defendant’s defense to it.217  In holding for Erickson, the court stated first that 
“[m]ale and female employees have different, sex-based disability and 
healthcare needs, and the law is no longer blind to the fact that only women 
can get pregnant, bear children, or use prescription contraception.”218  Even if 
Bartell denied coverage of contraceptives without an intent to discriminate 
against women, the court noted that an employer’s decision to cover all drugs 
and devices, except a few, created a legal obligation for that employer under 
 
 213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000). 
 214. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 n.2. 
 215. Id. at 1272. 
 216. Id. at 1269-71. 
 217. Id. at 1277. 
 218. Id. at 1271. 
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Title VII219 to ensure that the otherwise comprehensive benefits plan would 
“provide[] equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes,”220 and also would 
“not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics.”221  Since a large number 
of the excluded drugs and devices from Bartell’s plan would only be prescribed 
to women, the plan was deemed facially discriminatory, showing disparate 
treatment of male and female employees covered under Bartell’s prescription 
drug plan. 
A. Disparate Treatment in the Context of Erickson 
Erickson’s disparate treatment claim centered on the premise of the PDA 
that pregnancy discrimination is equivalent to sex discrimination.222  Erickson 
claimed: 
Contraception is “pregnancy-related” within the meaning of the PDA because 
it is medical treatment that provides women with the ability to control their 
biological potential for pregnancy.  Exclusion of contraception from a health 
plan is sex discrimination in violation of the PDA because it treats women 
differently on the basis of their potential to become pregnant.  The exclusion of 
contraception from [Bartell’s plan] is, therefore, sex discrimination on its face 
in violation of Title VII, as amended by the PDA.223 
As a case of first impression, Erickson’s facts differed from those of any prior 
case and presented a new focus through which the courts could recognize and 
analyze Title VII sex discrimination.224  While Erickson involved the exclusion 
of coverage for contraceptive drugs and devices,225 prior cases focused on the 
refusal to cover the disabling effects of pregnancy.226  Nonetheless, the 
Western District of Washington examined Erickson in terms of the legal 
 
 219. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. For a more extensive discussion of the PDA, see infra notes 175-85 and accompanying 
text.  For the purposes of analyzing Erickson’s disparate treatment claim and Bartell’s response 
thereto, it is necessary to understand that the PDA helped to define “sex discrimination” in Title 
VII by including decisions based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” with 
regard to both medical benefits plans and benefits for disability due to pregnancy.  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(k) (2000). 
 223. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 39, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 
1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (No. C00-1213L). 
 224. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Newport News Shipbuilding & 
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
 225. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. 
 226. See, e.g., Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 125; Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 672-73 
(holding that spouses of male employees are entitled to the same coverage for pregnancy-related 
disabilities as were female employees; the PDA did extend to the spouses of employees and not 
just employees themselves). 
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principles established by Gilbert and the PDA.227  The court noted, “[a]lthough 
this litigation involves an exclusion for prescription contraceptives rather than 
an exclusion for pregnancy-related disability costs, the legal principles 
established by Gilbert and its legislative reversal [by the PDA] govern the 
outcome of this case.”228  Particularly, the court noted that under the Gilbert 
requirements, because Bartell’s plan involved “no risk from which men [were] 
protected and women [were] not,” Bartell’s plan shared the same “facial 
parity” as General Electric’s plan had in Gilbert.229 
However, much had changed in the law between Gilbert, decided in 1976, 
and Erickson.  Instead of focusing on Gilbert, Erickson was appropriately 
based on more current law, specifically, the PDA and two tenets of law 
reaffirmed by it—“relative comprehensiveness of coverage” and “sex-based 
classifications” for coverage.230 The first tenet, relative comprehensive 
coverage, as explicated by Newport News, was that “equality under Title VII 
[was] measured by evaluating the relative comprehensiveness of coverage 
offered to the sexes . . . .”231  The Erickson court focused on the actual 
disparity of comprehensive coverage benefits between men and women instead 
of the deceptively “sex-neutral” identical lists of treatment for men and women 
that provided the facial parity upon which Gilbert was based.232  “Male and 
female employees have different, sex-based disability and healthcare needs, 
and the law is no longer blind to the fact that only women can get pregnant, 
bear children, or use prescription contraception.”233 The court decided, 
accordingly, that this tenet should apply to coverage for prescription 
contraception no differently than it applies to coverage for costs associated 
with pregnancy itself. 
The second tenet of the PDA, “that discrimination based on any sex-based 
characteristic is sex discrimination,”234 was described in UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc.,235 which further explained “that classifying employees on the 
basis of their childbearing capacity, regardless of whether they are, in fact, 
pregnant, is sex-based discrimination.”236  Furthermore, the Erickson court 
noted “[t]he special or increased healthcare needs associated with a woman’s 
unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the same extent, and on the 
 
 227. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1270-71 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 
484, 496-97 (1974))). 
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).  See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-71. 
 231. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
 232. Id. at 1271.  See also Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-40. 
 233. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
 234. Id. 
 235. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 236. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271 (citing Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197-98). 
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same terms, as other healthcare needs.”237  Therefore, Bartell’s plan caused 
disparate treatment of its female employees as prohibited under Title VII. 
Regardless of whether Bartell’s plan was intentionally discriminatory (and 
the court doubted this intention),238 it did, on its face, discriminate against 
women due to the facts that, first, the plan was not comprehensive for the 
specific health care needs of women (it was not relatively comprehensive),239 
and, second, Bartell’s choice of exclusions followed the lines of sex-based 
needs (it was based on a sex-based classification).240  Ultimately, after 
reviewing “the legislative history of Title VII and the PDA, the language of the 
statute itself, and the relevant case law,”241 the court found Bartell’s 
prescription plan exclusions to be “inconsistent with the requirements of 
federal law.”242 
B. Bartell’s Defenses to Disparate Treatment: Same Exclusions for Female 
Employees and Dependants; Facial Neutrality 
In response to Erickson’s claim of disparate treatment, Bartell argued that 
“its prescription plan [was] not discriminatory because the female dependants 
of male employees [were] subject to the same exclusions as [were] female 
employees.”243  Particularly, Bartell argued that the prescription contraceptive 
drugs and devices were excluded since they belonged to the “family planning” 
classification prescriptions, all of which were excluded from the plan.244  Since 
all family planning drugs such as infertility drugs and contraceptives were 
excluded, according to Bartell, this resulted in a facially neutral provision.245 
However, the court noted that no specific family planning exclusion was 
stated in the plan, and further, other drugs that could be classified as family 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1271-72 n.7.  Erickson doubts that the plan was intentional in its discrimination 
against women: 
The most reasonable explanation for the current state of affairs is that the exclusion of 
women-only benefits is merely an unquestioned holdover from a time when employment-
related benefits were doled out less equitably than they [were] today.  The lack of 
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Title VII claim.  Where a benefit plan is discriminatory on its face, no inquiry into 
subjective intent is necessary. 
Id. (citing Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 
463 U.S. 1073, 1080-86 (1983)). 
 239. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72. 
 240. Id. at 1272. 
 241. Id. at 1271. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 1272 n.8. 
 244. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275. 
 245. Id. at 1272. 
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planning, such as prenatal vitamins, were covered.246  The court ultimately 
rejected Bartell’s facial neutrality argument because: 
First, discriminating against a protected class cannot be justified through 
consistency. Second, Bartell ignore[d] the clear import of Congress’ 
repudiation of Gilbert: a policy which use[d] sex-based characteristics to limit 
benefits, thereby creating a plan which [was] less comprehensive for one sex 
than the other, violate[d] Title VII.247 
The court also responded that even if there was a family planning exclusion, 
and assuming that the exclusion of infertility drugs affects the sexes without 
parity, this particular exclusion of contraceptives in Erickson still affected 
women much more than men, and was still discriminatory.248 
[T]here is at least an argument that the exclusion of infertility drugs applie[d] 
equally to male and female employees, making the coverage offered to all 
employees less comprehensive in roughly the same amount and manner.  The 
additional exclusion of prescription contraceptives, however, reduces the 
comprehensiveness of the coverage offered to female employees while leaving 
the coverage offered to male employees unchanged.249 
Ultimately, Bartell was unable to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for its exclusion of coverage for contraceptive drugs and devices.  This 
was enough for the Erickson court to conclude that Bartell’s plan discriminated 
against its female employees.  Bartell’s use of the “facial neutrality”250 
defense, however, cuts against the employer since the concept is often a 
characteristic of (note, not a defense to) claims of disparate impact. 
C. Disparate Impact in the Context of Erickson 
Erickson’s argument of disparate impact in violation of Title VII was also 
based on the PDA amendment of Title VII.  Erickson alleged: 
The exclusion of contraception from [Bartell’s plan] also [had] an adverse 
disparate impact on women in violation of Title VII because it force[d] them 
either to pay for prescription contraceptives out of pocket, despite having 
 
 246. Id. at 1275. 
 247. Id. at 1272 n.8. 
 248. Id. at 1275. 
 249. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275. 
 250. Id. at 1274-75.  The defendant was in a truly tough position in Erickson.  While Bartell 
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at 1275.  However, the court’s discussion appears to imply that there was also a claim of disparate 
impact despite the lack of facial neutrality in the policy, as facial neutrality is not an absolute 
statutory requirement to a finding of disparate treatment.  See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000). 
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prescription insurance coverage, or to bear the physical, emotional and 
financial burdens of unplanned pregnancy.  Bartell’s policy of excluding 
contraceptive coverage [could not] be justified as job-related and consistent 
with business necessity.251 
The 1991 Civil Rights Act added the prima facie requirements for disparate 
impact to Title VII, requiring that a claimant show that his or her employer 
utilized “a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the [employer] fails to 
demonstrate that the challenged practice is . . . consistent with business 
necessity.”252  But, as stated in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a 
disparate impact claim typically “involve[s] employment practices that are 
facially neutral.”253  As we have seen in the discussion of the disparate 
treatment theory under Title VII, Bartell’s policy was not facially neutral and 
did exhibit disparate treatment in its classification of benefit exclusions based 
on sex as well as its lack of relative comprehensiveness.254  For these reasons 
Erickson did not directly discuss the plaintiff’s allegation of disparate impact 
since a finding of disparate treatment rendered it moot.  However, the court did 
discuss Bartell’s defense to disparate impact: that the plan was justified by a 
business decision to control costs.255 
D. Bartell’s Defense to Disparate Impact: Business Decision to Control 
Costs 
Bartell argued that “it should be permitted to limit the scope of its 
employee benefit programs in order to control costs.”256  However, it is well 
settled law that “cost is not . . . a defense to allegations of discrimination under 
Title VII.”257  This concept was codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991: the 
employer must show “that the challenged practice is job related for the position 
in question and consistent with business necessity.”258  Bartell failed to satisfy 
either of these statutory requirements. 
 
 251. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 40, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 
1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001)  (No. C00-1213L). 
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 255. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274. 
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 257. Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
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In addition, though typically utilized as a defense to disparate impact, the 
1991 Civil Rights Act also made clear that “business necessity” fails in the 
disparate treatment arena.  Cost controlling devices that an employer attributes 
to a business necessity, regarding “[a] demonstration that an employment 
practice is required by business necessity, may not be used as a defense against 
a claim of intentional discrimination . . . .”259 
Furthermore, in its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, the 
EEOC stated that “[i]t shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of sex 
discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect 
to one sex than the other.”260  An important distinction should be made here in 
order to better understand the legal statement made by Erickson: although cost 
was not a defense to Title VII violations,261 Erickson recognized that entities 
were free to assert control of the scope of their enterprise, so long as the 
method to “curb costs” was not discriminatory. 262  Particularly, the court stated 
that 
  Title VII does not require employers to offer any particular type or 
category of benefit.  However, when an employer decides to offer a 
prescription plan covering everything except a few specifically excluded drugs 
and devices, it has a legal obligation to make sure that the resulting plan does 
not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics and that it provides equally 
comprehensive coverage for both sexes.263 
Nonetheless, the court recognized that “Bartell offer[ed] its employees an 
admittedly generous package of healthcare benefits, including both third-party 
healthcare plans and an in-house prescription program” and that “[t]he cost 
savings Bartell realize[d] by excluding prescription contraceptives from its 
healthcare plans [were] being directly borne by only one sex in violation of 
Title VII.”264  Therefore, if somehow disparate treatment was not proven, and 
disparate impact was, Bartell’s defense of “cost,” in terms of a “business 
necessity” issue, would have been rejected by the court.  “Even if one were to 
assume that Bartell’s prescription plan was not the result of intentional 
discrimination, the exclusion of women-only benefits from a generally 
comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination under Title VII.”265  In 
 
 259. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (emphasis added). 
 260. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e).  For a discussion of the cost defense in terms of disparate impact 
cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2).  See also supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text. 
 261. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-18.  The “cost defense” to 
disparate treatment is handled in case law; however cost, in terms of business necessity is rejected 
as a defense to disparate impact in Title VII language.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2). 
 262. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 263. Id. at 1272 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 
676 (1983). 
 264. Id. at 1274. 
 265. Id. at 1271-72. 
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addition, there was no showing that the exclusion was, in any way “job related 
for the position in question.”266  This showing, in addition to a satisfactory 
showing of “business necessity,” would be necessary for a finding in favor of 
Bartell on the disparate impact claim.267  Without going into a detailed analysis 
of disparate impact under Title VII, the Erickson court suggested that even if 
Erickson had not proved her disparate treatment claim, a disparate impact 
claim could have also secured her victory. 
E. The PDA in the Context of Erickson 
As noted in the discussion of Erickson’s finding of disparate treatment, the 
court relied largely on the PDA in its analysis.  Erickson also contributed to 
Title VII jurisprudence by interpreting the PDA to include conditions and 
treatment prior to impregnation, and not just pregnancy itself.  “Read in the 
context of Title VII as a whole, it is a broad acknowledgement of the intent of 
Congress to outlaw any and all discrimination against any and all women in the 
terms and conditions of their employment, including the benefits an employer 
provides to its employees.”268  This was an interpretation that Bartell flatly 
disputed. 
F. Bartell’s Defense to PDA Applicability 
1. Incorrect Interpretation of the Scope of the PDA 
Bartell argued that the PDA did not discuss discrimination in terms of 
pregnancy prevention, and its exclusion of prescription contraceptives thereby 
did not violate the PDA.269  Particularly, Bartell argued that the exclusion of 
prescription contraceptives did not fall under the umbrella of “pregnancy, 
childbirth or related medical conditions,” to trigger PDA applicability.270  In 
other words, Bartell relied on the assertion that control of one’s fertility, what 
Erickson sought, was “not ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions’ as those terms are used in the PDA.”271  While the court conceded 
that the PDA did not specifically comment on prescription contraceptives, it 
did note that “the decision to exclude drugs made for women from a generally 
comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination under Title VII, with or 
 
 266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A )(i) (2000). 
 267. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).  Or, in the alternative, Bartell’s defense to disparate impact 
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 268. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
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without the clarification provided by the PDA.”272  In addition, Erickson found 
that “regardless of whether the prevention of pregnancy falls within the phrase 
‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,’ Congress’ decisive 
overruling of [Gilbert], evidence[d] an interpretation of Title VII which 
necessarily preclude[d] the choices Bartell [made].”273  The Erickson court also 
replied that “the relevant issue”274 was whether Title VII was violated 
regardless of the definition of “sex” (either from the PDA or pre-PDA) used; 
this was a settled issue to the court, again, because Bartell’s plan constituted a 
classification by sex and lacked relative comprehensiveness in coverage for 
sex-based medical needs.275 
2. Contraceptives Not a Health Care Need 
Bartell’s most provocative argument, however, was that its refusal to cover 
“prescription contraceptive devices is not a violation of Title VII because . . . 
treating contraceptives differently from other prescription drugs [was] 
reasonable in that contraceptives are voluntary, preventative, [did] not treat or 
prevent an illness or disease, and [was] not truly a ‘healthcare’ issue.”276  The 
court framed its response to this defense around two ideas: (1) the similarity of 
fertility control to other diseases treated by prescription medications;277 and (2) 
the “irrelevant distinction” of the preventative nature of contraceptives.278 
First, the court recognized that “[a]n underlying theme in Bartell’s 
argument is that a woman’s ability to control her fertility differs from the type 
of illness and disease normally treated with prescription drugs in such 
significant respects that it is permissible to treat prescription contraceptives 
differently than all other prescription medicines.”279  It noted, however, that a 
similar distinction was made in the majority opinion of Gilbert.280  The court 
clearly disagreed with this distinction, and cited to many sociological reports in 
its argument that unintended pregnancies “carry enormous costs and health 
consequences for the mother, the child, and society as a whole.”281  
Furthermore, the court felt that “[t]he availability of a reliable, affordable way 
to prevent unintended pregnancies would go a long way toward ameliorating 
the ills [associated therewith].”282 
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Finally, the court determined that Bartell’s argument that prescription 
contraception was of a “preventative nature” was “irrelevant” because “Bartell 
cover[ed] a number of preventative drugs under its plan.”283  This was a 
“distinction without a difference” because “[p]rescription contraceptives, like 
all other preventative drugs, help the recipient avoid unwanted physical 
changes.”284  Furthermore, due to the fact that “obtaining an effective method 
of contraception is a primary healthcare issue throughout much of a woman’s 
life,”285 the court found that any “distinction[] that can be drawn between 
prescription contraceptives and . . . other prescription drugs,”286 would not be 
“substantive or otherwise justif[y] the exclusion of contraceptives from a 
generally comprehensive healthcare plan.”287 
G. Bartell’s Legislative Arguments 
Finally, Bartell set forth two arguments endorsing a rigid legal system, and 
these arguments replicated the state of the legal system at the time of Gilbert.  
Bartell essentially asked the court “why now” and questioned Erickson’s 
interpretation of Title VII. 
1. New Interpretation of an Old Law 
Bartell argued that Title VII had been law for thirty-seven years, and it 
seemed questionable that the court was formulating this holding at this point 
and not sooner.288  The court’s reply was simple.  “[U]ntil this case, no court 
had been asked to evaluate the common practice of excluding contraceptives 
from a generally comprehensive health plan under Title VII.”289  Furthermore, 
the Erickson court, when faced with this question, was “constitutionally 
required to rule on the issue before it.”290 
In addition, while the judicial system had never before been faced with this 
issue, the EEOC had previously made statements to its merit, most recently in 
December, 2000.291  The December 2000 EEOC Decision, like Erickson, 
 
 283. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (emphasis added).  Particularly, Bartell’s plan covered 
preventative medications such as “blood-pressure and cholesterol-lowering drugs, hormone 
replacement therapies, prenatal vitamins, and drugs to prevent allergic reactions, breast cancer, 
and blood clotting.”  Id. at 1268 n.1. 
 284. Id. at 1273. 
 285. Id. at 1273-74. 
 286. Id. at 1274. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 1275-76.  See also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Decision on 
Coverage of Contraception, (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-
contraception.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002). 
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interpreted the PDA to apply to prescription contraceptives, regardless of the 
intended use of those medications.292  The Erickson court could have followed 
in the footsteps of Gilbert, and completely discounted the EEOC Decision.293  
However, the dissent of Justice Brennan in Gilbert, as affirmed by the 
legislative history of the PDA, advocated according more weight to the 
EEOC.294  Whether this affirmation encouraged Erickson not to repeat the 
mistakes of Gilbert is unclear; more likely, what drew the court’s attention to 
the EEOC Decision of December 2000 was its determination that 
comprehensive insurance policies  that denied prescription contraception 
“‘circumscribed the treatment options available to women, but not to men,’” 
thereby violating Title VII.295 
2. Legislative Issue 
Bartell argued that the legislature, not the judiciary, should be reviewing 
this question.296  It is probably the most well settled proposition in American 
legal history that “‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.’”297  Even though, at the time of Erickson, 
“Congress and some state legislatures [were] considering proposals to require 
insurance plans to cover prescription contraceptives, that fact [did] not alter 
[the] Court’s constitutional role in interpreting Congress’ legislative 
enactments in order to resolve private disputes.”298 
VI. CRITICAL EVALUATIONS OF ERICKSON V. BARTELL 
A.   Erickson’s Argument: Sex Discrimination Under Title VII 
Erickson argued that, by its refusal to cover contraceptive drugs and 
devices under its otherwise comprehensive prescription drug plan, Bartell 
discriminated based on sex, as prohibited under the PDA amendment to Title 
VII.  Erickson’s mere ability to make her arguments, not to mention her 
success in the outcome of the case, was made possible by the long line of cases 
and statutes initiated by the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The laws upon which 
Erickson relied did not appear overnight but were instead the results of years of 
trial and error—seemingly continuous adjustments of the parameters of Title 
 
 292. Id. 
 293. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976); see also supra notes 136-40 
and accompanying text. 
 294. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155-59. 
 295. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 (quoting U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Decision on Coverage of Contraception, (Dec. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-contraception.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002)). 
 296. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276. 
 297. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 298. Id. at 1276. 
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VII sex discrimination—in both Congress and in the courts.  Clearly, change is 
the only constant of Title VII, even after the legislative clarifications achieved 
by the PDA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 
To understand Erickson’s place in the law today requires an understanding 
of the concept of “sex discrimination” and an overview of its continual re-
definition in the law. This journey began with the determination in Gilbert that, 
in effect, pregnancy did not equate to sex, and the disabilities associated with 
pregnancy could be excluded on an “additional risks” basis.299  It is an 
interesting idea that a woman’s “extra” reproductive organs which allow her to 
carry a child and give birth would be construed as “additional,” given that such 
organs seem quite fundamental to the definition of “woman.”300  This 
permitted discrimination against not all women, but only pregnant ones 
reaching their biological potential, in reproductive terms.  Justice Brennan’s 
dissent revealed that the difference in opinion rested not on whether pregnancy 
was “sex related”—clearly it was.301  Instead, the distinction fell upon whether 
the Court should equate pregnancy with a disease.  It was clearly a medical 
condition, but since it could be deemed an intended and favorable medical 
condition, did this make it different from other diseases?  The Gilbert majority 
felt that it did; Justice Brennan and Congress disagreed. 
The PDA clarified the intent of Congress that the “sex discrimination” it 
included in Title VII also meant “pregnancy discrimination,” since only 
women could become pregnant, and, therefore, the condition affected and was 
confined to the protected class of women.302  The PDA should not, however, 
be viewed as a victory for women—that occurred when “sex” was included in 
Title VII in 1964.  Instead, the Gilbert—PDA situation showed the legislature 
clarifying its purpose, a purpose which, as the 1964 Title VII legislative history 
showed, had been unclear.  Nonetheless, it secured the proposition that 
Brennan and the lower courts touted: Pregnancy discrimination is Title VII sex 
discrimination.303 
The final step in this journey—and the biggest hurdle for Erickson—was 
convincing a court to interpret the PDA also to include drugs and devices used 
to prevent pregnancy.  Erickson’s argument had to be framed in the context of 
women’s role in American society in the year 2001.  While many women at 
this time continued to choose the role of stay-at-home mom, many others were 
working to gain an education and career, to be recognized as successful 
businesspersons.  These women understood that becoming pregnant early on in 
 
 299. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-40. 
 300. This is only one definition of “woman”—the biological one. 
 301. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149. 
 302. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at 3-5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 1978 WL 
8570. 
 303. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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their lives, perhaps during their education, or early in their career, could 
prevent or hinder them in reaching their professional goals.  Erickson argued, 
on behalf of herself and these women, that they should be able to fulfill their 
professional goals before choosing to start a family,304 and delaying pregnancy 
would be best achieved by utilizing contraceptive drugs and devices. 
There is more to the coverage of contraceptive drugs and devices than a 
simple medical issue.  Because having a child is an event that can change a 
woman’s entire life, denial of contraceptive coverage becomes much larger 
than a mere health concern, as its consequences affect all aspects of a woman’s 
life.  In a woman’s professional life, in particular, denial of coverage hampers 
the realization of “equality” in the workplace by not insuring medications that 
help women maintain their status and progress in the professional sphere.  It is 
a biological condition that is, by definition, different for men and women; and 
that pregnancy is sex-based makes it, as well as its prevention, subject to Title 
VII compliance.  Furthermore, refusing to cover drugs that prevent a condition 
solely confined to women, such as pregnancy, that ultimately limits women in 
their life goals does constitute sex discrimination.  Indeed, Erickson’s greatest 
contribution to the law of sex discrimination is not only its clarification of the 
meaning of the PDA, but the “equality effect” that this holding provides for 
women in the professional sphere. 
B. Bartell’s Defenses to Title VII Sex Discrimination 
1. Analysis: Defense of Facial Neutrality 
Bartell argued that since its prescription plan was “facially neutral,” and 
excluded the same medications from men and women, it did not discriminate 
based on sex.  This, of course, denies the fact that men and women have 
different health care needs, and takes us back in time to Gilbert, where the 
Court deemed a disability plan nondiscriminatory because “there is no risk 
from which men are protected and women are not,” and “no risk from which 
women are protected and men are not.”305  The flaw in this reasoning—that 
only women get pregnant—was addressed and corrected by the PDA.  Bartell 
also attempted to show that the plan was neutral in that it excluded all “family 
planning” measures.306  Though this defense was intended to defeat the claim 
of disparate treatment, the Erickson court took it in a different direction, using 
 
 304. Though Erickson intended to delay pregnancy until after she had worked some time, this 
is really an issue about planning.  Not all women decide to have children after they have a 
career—some do it beforehand.  The point is that requiring employers to cover prescription 
contraceptive drugs and devices in their otherwise comprehensive plans gives women and their 
spouses the tools to plan their families. 
 305. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)). 
 306. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1275 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
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it to imply that men, as well as women, could be discriminated against in the 
context of comprehensive employer-based health insurance exclusions.307 
Bartell made a point of showing that Viagra was also excluded from its 
prescription plan.308  Even though the issue of Viagra coverage was not at bar 
in Erickson, the court noted, at least initially, that the argument for Viagra 
coverage would be the same as Erickson’s, and could state a claim for 
violation of male employees’ rights under Title VII.309  That Bartell’s plan did 
not cover Viagra, though unfortunate for the individuals needing it, puts 
Erickson and its message about sex discrimination under Title VII in an even 
better position.  Particularly, that women alleging a sex discrimination case for 
denial of contraceptive coverage do not need their employer to provide Viagra 
coverage to bolster their arguments for coverage of birth control.  Further, it 
allows those following the law to not mistake the reasoning behind Erickson.  
Under Erickson, female employees are entitled to prescription contraceptive 
drug coverage because Title VII and the PDA demand it, not because men 
receive coverage for sex-based prescription drugs, namely Viagra.  Without 
Viagra in the equation, individuals studying the law can use Erickson as a tool 
to explain further the scope of the PDA and Title VII.  This reduces the 
tendency of the reader to see Erickson as a mere battle of the sexes by a simple 
comparison of Bartell’s sex-based benefits.  Finally, even if Bartell’s 
improvised “family planning” exclusion had the facial parity it contended it 
had, this would have had little effect on the determination of a Title VII 
violation, since adverse disparate impact could have easily stemmed from a 
facially neutral policy.310 
2. Analysis: Business Decision to Control Costs 
Bartell’s argument that its choice to deny contraceptives was a business 
decision aimed to control costs clearly failed because of its facially 
discriminatory effect on its female employees.  Even a cost-based decision to 
exclude prescription contraception that caused sex-based disparate treatment of 
Bartell’s employees violates Title VII.  If an employer wants to control its 
costs, it must be conscious in handling that task, realizing that any “cost-
controlling mechanism” must not treat employees differently due to their 
 
 307. See id. at 1274-75. 
 308. Id. at 1275 n.12.  For a discussion of Viagra’s position in the dispute over contraceptive 
coverage and Title VII, see Kathryn Kindell, Prescription for Fairness: Health Insurance 
Reimbursement for Viagra and Contraceptives, 35 TULSA L.J. 399 (2000); Lisa A. Hayden, 
Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System: Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 
J.L. & HEALTH 171 (1999). 
 309. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 n.12. 
 310. Id. at 1271-72. 
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sex.311  Bartell’s “cost-controlling mechanism” was clearly an impermissible 
one, since the method it used to cut costs negatively affected one sex—
women.312  As Erickson noted, Bartell could not control its costs legally by 
“penaliz[ing] female employees in an effort to keep its benefit costs low.”313 
Moving away from the legal principles in Erickson that prohibit cost-based 
business justifications that discriminate against women and viewing them in 
another light, this holding against the Bartell Drug Company may actually be 
beneficial for it.  Though employers who offer comprehensive health benefits 
plans will be forced to at least partially cover prescription contraceptive drugs 
and devices, this will reduce the number of pregnancies and the health care 
costs associated therewith.  Furthermore, these new costs are not anticipated to 
be significant: 
New AGI estimates—based on the actual experience of plans that cover the 
cost of oral contraceptives (information obtained from pharmacy benefit 
managers administering plans covering over half the U.S. population) and on 
national data on use of other methods by privately insured women—show that 
the cost of covering the full range of FDA-approved reversible contraceptive 
methods is minimal. . . . Providing coverage for the full range of reversible 
contraceptive methods would result in a total cost of $21.40 per employee per 
year.  Assuming standard cost-sharing between employers and employees, 
employers would pay $17.12, which translates into a monthly cost of $1.43 per 
employee.  This would increase employers’ overall insurance costs by only 
0.6%.314 
In addition, contraceptive coverage will allow female employees an 
enhanced ability to plan their families and improve their health in general by 
limiting unintended pregnancies while also offering some of the positive side 
effects of these drugs (such as birth controls providing more tolerable 
menstrual symptoms).  Improving the health and family planning abilities of 
female employees could conceivably promote a more effective workplace, too.  
If workers feel better, they will most likely work better.  As the Planned 
Parenthood Web site, established to answer questions about contraceptive 
coverage, has noted: 
A recent study calculated that for an average employer, the total indirect cost 
of pregnancy-related absences per year per 1,000 covered female employees 
would be $542,000.  It is estimated that the average cost to replace female 
 
 311. Id. at 1272 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 
676 (1983)). 
 312. Id. at 1274. 
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 314. Rachel Benson Gold, The Need for and Cost of Mandating Private Insurance Coverage 
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employees who quit each year due to pregnancy is an additional $14,000 per 
employee.315 
Similarly, workers who are not suffering the mental and emotional anguish 
over an unplanned pregnancy, not to mention the physical limitations, will also 
likely perform better in the workplace. 
3. Analysis: Incorrect Interpretation of the Scope of the PDA Not to 
Include Contraceptives 
In re-examining the court’s response to Bartell’s PDA argument, one can 
see that this boils down to differing legal interpretations: Bartell interpreted the 
language of the PDA as to only include currently pregnant women; Erickson 
believed that it should include women with the ability to become pregnant.  
This is where Erickson departed from prior case law and went out on a limb, 
extending the PDA to include birth control coverage, ultimately changing the 
law.  Erickson framed its arguments on what it saw as the intent of Congress in 
legislatively overturning Gilbert with the PDA.  Though the EEOC had 
decided in December of 2000 to take the PDA as far as Erickson had, this was 
the first time for a court to apply it in this manner.  So this issue of interpreting 
Congressional intent for the PDA, as a case of first impression, understandably 
did not receive much citation-laden discussion.  It was instead a struggle 
between tradition and innovation, and this time the latter won. 
The Erickson holding is similar to other post-PDA holdings, except that it 
formally stated that the protections by the PDA should also apply to 
contraceptive drugs in addition to coverage for the condition of pregnancy and 
disabilities caused by pregnancy.  Erickson was made possible in part due to 
the determination by UAW v. Johnson Controls that the PDA applied not only 
to policies excluding coverage for pregnant women but also to policy 
exclusions which “classif[ied] on the basis of gender and childbearing 
capacity.”316  This removed the “pregnant” element from claimants suing under 
the PDA amendment to Title VII; now the PDA would be triggered not just by 
pregnancy, but also by the policy exclusions that were based on sex and the 
woman’s inherent ability to bear children. 
4. Analysis: Contraceptives Not a Health Care Need 
Again, Bartell argued that refusal to cover “prescription contraceptive 
devices [was] not a violation of Title VII because . . . treating contraceptives 
differently from other prescription drugs [was] reasonable in that 
contraceptives are voluntary, preventative, do not treat or prevent an illness or 
disease, and are not truly a ‘healthcare’ issue.”317  This is a loaded argument 
 
 315. Planned Parenthood, supra note 9. 
 316. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1991). 
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and rests on at least three concepts that stretch it across not only the question of 
medical coverage but social and moral spectra as well.  These concepts are: (1) 
the legitimacy of pregnancy prevention as a true “healthcare” issue and the 
validity of contraceptives as preventative medicine; (2) the voluntary aspect of 
contraception; and (3) external control over the sexual behavior (and lives) of 
women. 
This first concept is the adequacy of “pregnancy-prevention” as a true 
healthcare issue.  Bartell argued that pregnancy does not qualify as an illness 
or disease, and prevention of pregnancy via contraceptives is not a 
“healthcare” issue at all.318  Birth control pills, Depro-Provera, Norplant, and 
the IUD are indeed medical treatments, drugs and devices manufactured by the 
pharmaceutical companies and tested by the FDA.  It is important here to note 
that this coverage would not extend to over-the-counter contraceptive 
therapies, such as condoms, spermicidal ointments or the female sponge, but 
only to medications prescribed by doctors.  In order to obtain a prescription for 
these medications, a patient would have to discuss it with her physician, and 
together the two would make a medical decision in the best interests of the 
patient.  Furthermore, as it has been seen in some cases, these medications are 
not only prescribed for pregnancy prevention, but also treat other health 
conditions, particularly hormonal disorders. 319 
Bartell also argued that the preventative nature of contraceptive drugs and 
devices de-classify them as truly legitimate medications.  This label 
“preventative” is not inaccurate.  Indeed, it is a preventative measure that is not 
unlike many other preventative measures that are considered legitimate 
healthcare issues such as vaccines, annual gynecological exams and yearly 
physicals.  In fact, the condition that contraception works to prevent, 
pregnancy, carries with it both very serious physically disabling side effects, as 
well as an immense long-term life-changing occurrence—a child. 
Recently, there has been an effort in the medical field towards encouraging 
preventative measures in health care.  Consider the popularity of taking aspirin 
daily to avoid heart attacks, the necessity of pre-natal care, and the information 
about monthly breast self-exams and the importance of mammograms 
constantly displayed on all advertising media.  Not only are these preventative 
medicine practices believed to be advantageous to patients’ health, but they are 
also good for the pocketbooks of insurers.  For example, in the area of 
contraception, one source reported that the care for a mother and child for 
pregnancy costs $10,000 and a first trimester abortion costs $450, but a one-
 
 318. Id. at 1272. 
 319. See supra note 13; EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 
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year supply of birth control pills costs $300.320  Clearly, it is much less 
expensive for an insurer to cover the medications than the abortion or the 
pregnancy.  And these figures do not take into account the mental, emotional 
and physical costs undertaken for the first two options.321  Not unlike other 
insured preventative treatments, contraceptives prevent a defined health 
condition, “pregnancy,” and the many other health problems associated 
therewith. 
The most dramatic prevention, of course, is that of a new life that if not 
desired by the mother could end up, sadly, aborted.  “Half of all pregnancies 
are unintended; 28% of women aged 15-44 have had an unplanned birth and 
30% have had an abortion; 60% of women in their 30s have had an unplanned 
birth or an abortion.”322  On the other hand, the child could be born to a mother 
who is not prepared financially, emotionally or psychologically for parenthood, 
yielding a devastating situation for both mother and child. 
In 1988, 56% of pregnancies were unintended, either mis-timed or unwanted at 
conception.  The consequences of unintended pregnancy are thought to be 
substantial: Unintended pregnancy has been shown to be associated with late 
prenatal care, maternal smoking during pregnancy, low birth weight, infant 
mortality, child abuse, and developmental delay. . . . “[T]he consequences of 
unintended pregnancy are serious, imposing appreciable burdens on children, 
women, men and families.”323 
Studies have also shown that a woman’s intention to have a child affects the 
woman’s prenatal behaviors:324 “That mothers of unintended births are slower 
to recognize their pregnancy and to obtain medical attention increases their 
health risks and those of their baby.”325  The Center for Disease Control has 
found that: 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
512 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:463 
Unintended pregnancy is associated with increased morbidity and mortality for 
the mother and infant.  Lifestyle factors (for example, smoking, drinking 
alcohol, unsafe sex practices, and poor nutrition) and inadequate intake of 
foods containing folic acid pose serious health hazards to the mother and fetus 
and are more common among women with unintended pregnancies.  In 
addition . . . approximately half of women with unintended pregnancies do not 
start prenatal care during the first trimester.326 
Clearly, an employer’s exclusion of “preventative” measures will not 
always limit its expenditures for medical insurance.  Most important, however, 
is not that these contraceptive devices are “preventative” measures, but that 
they are also, and to a greater degree, responsible measures taken by sexually 
active women to avoid devastating consequences in their lives.  Perhaps it is 
this self-imposed responsibility, and attempted self-sufficiency of women that 
bothers insurers and employers, that has kept this issue undecided for so long. 
Second, the defendant questioned the voluntary aspects of the medications.  
Men and women in the U.S. take “voluntary” medications every day.327  Take, 
for example, allergy medications and acne treatments.  These are prescriptions 
for conditions that are not necessarily “life threatening,” but the drugs make us 
feel better.  It is an inconvenience for a patient to suffer from a runny nose 
every time she steps out the door in the spring, so she will go to the doctor for 
an antihistamine.  Similarly, when a patient wants his skin to clear up, he will 
see the dermatologist for a topical treatment.  In comparison to the 
contraceptive medications at issue that will be taken to prevent a pregnancy—
quite possibly the most monumental life experience a woman will encounter—
the argument that they are “voluntary” seriously and misleadingly 
underestimates the effects of the condition they prevent.  Further, when 
comparing the effects of different medications that can be deemed 
“voluntary”—antihistamines, acne topical treatments and birth control—it is 
plain that the latter has the largest potential to affect a patient’s life. 
Another way to examine the “voluntary” argument is that since women are 
voluntarily engaging in sex, contraception is not a medical necessity since the 
woman could easily alleviate the need for contraception by refraining from 
sexual behavior.  This brings into light all of the conditions that occur from 
sexual intercourse—particularly sexually transmitted diseases.328  Does this 
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“voluntary” argument suggest that when a patient contracts HIV329 from a 
sexual partner there should be no obligation to cover the patient since the 
behavior she exhibited in contracting the virus was “voluntary?”  Is this 
argument also to extend to coverage of an HIV inoculation, if one is ever 
created?  Since sex is a voluntary activity, a participant should be wholly 
responsible for the side effects it causes, even if preventative; refusing 
prescription contraception coverage inhibits both this responsibility and the 
freedoms that accompany it. 
The last concept of this argument expresses an overarching “pretext” of the 
defendant’s basis for refusing to cover prescription contraceptives.  It concerns 
the apparent control women assert over their bodies and fertility when using 
contraceptive drugs and devices—that contraceptives are “voluntary and 
preventative” measures, and that her fertility, since it is controllable, is 
different from other health care concerns.330  The court discussed this concept 
in terms of the consequences occurring when women were not able to control 
their fertility, particularly in terms of unwanted pregnancies and in the 
woman’s change of appearance.331  Erickson summarized these consequences: 
A woman with an unintended pregnancy is less likely to seek prenatal care, 
more likely to engage in unhealthy activities, more likely to have an abortion, 
and more likely to deliver a low birthweight, ill, or unwanted baby.  
Unintended pregnancies impose significant financial burdens on the parents in 
the best of circumstances.  If the pregnancy results in a distressed newborn, the 
costs increase by tens of thousands of dollars.  In addition, the adverse 
economic and social consequences of unintended pregnancies fall most harshly 
on women and interfere with their choice to participate fully and equally in the 
“marketplace and the world of ideas.”332 
With or without the Court’s discussion of the sad results and heavy impacts on 
the lives of both mother and child in unintended pregnancies, it is not difficult 
to understand or to defend women in this all-too-often devastating situation. 
However, just as relevant to this discussion is the principle of the matter.  
Clouded by a “cost benefit” argument and a strict interpretation of the PDA, 
insurers and employers, by excluding contraceptives from prescription plans, 
are in effect asserting heavy-handed paternalism.  They are asserting control 
over the sexual behavior and general health of their female beneficiaries in 
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excluding coverage and reducing accessibility to these medications.  So it 
comes down to this question: Who should have the control over women’s 
fertility?  Until Erickson, it was the employers and insurers.  Now, thankfully, 
that control will move into the hands of women themselves. 
This principle is especially relevant today when women are having sex at 
early ages and are planning their marriages and children around professional 
careers. 
Adolescents in the United States have a higher proportion of pregnancies that 
are unintended and that end in abortion than do adults.  Moreover, adolescents 
who have initiated sexual intercourse have some of the highest age-specific 
rates of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) which along with unintended 
pregnancy impose enormous costs in human pain and suffering, in social and 
economic opportunity, and in social welfare and health care.333 
Now, as more women are increasingly sexually active and increasingly present 
in the professional spheres, this control over their health and life-path is even 
more vital.334  The notion of controlling one’s fertility (i.e., by not engaging in 
sex) is reminiscent of a moral code that is admirably traditional and noble in 
some societies, and archaic and inequitable in others.  While many modern 
women are working to assert control while using mechanisms (prescription 
contraceptives) to control their fertility, insurers are faced with establishing 
their own moral code of coverage.335  Family planning is nothing to be 
ashamed of—it is a positive benefit that is the result of growing medical 
technology and helps people to maximize their pursuits in life to, in effect, 
have better and more fulfilling lives. 
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5. Analysis: Legislative Issues—New Interpretation of an Old Law 
Erickson marked the first time that an employee asked a court to require 
her employer to cover her prescription contraceptives.336  The Erickson court 
cited to Professor Sylvia Law’s article to set forth reasons why this question 
has taken so long to arrive in the courts.337  Law noted that “[f]irst, women 
affected by this exclusion, and indeed responsible employers, have difficulty 
obtaining even basic information about insurance coverage.  Second, there are 
few lawyers available who are willing to take the financial risk necessary to 
raise these claims.”338  These reasons do not only explain why the question had 
not been brought before, but also may show why Erickson was so successful.  
Specifically, Erickson was a pharmacist working for a drug company; these are 
two parties that are more likely to know a bit more about the health insurance 
industry than others.  In addition, Erickson was a class action suit brought on 
behalf of all female, non-union employees of Bartell by attorney Roberta Riley 
and Planned Parenthood; this definitely helped defray the costs to the plaintiff 
and very likely provided resources to Riley throughout the litigation. 
6. Analysis: The Question of Contraceptive Coverage Under the PDA Is 
a Legislative Issue 
Bartell contended that the Erickson court should not answer the question of 
whether the PDA involves contraceptive coverage and should leave it to the 
legislature.  The court refused this request, however, noting its constitutional 
obligation to interpret the laws.339  If history would repeat itself, and had the 
Erickson court held for Bartell, the issue may have actually been heard by the 
legislature, not unlike the events of Gilbert and its legislative overturning in 
the PDA.  Yet even an incorrect interpretation of the law, would be better than 
no interpretation at all.  The legislature has, in fact, taken a step in this 
direction by introducing the Equity in Prescription Insurance and 
Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC), which “would secure, as a matter of 
federal law, universal coverage for all women with insurance throughout the 
United States.”340 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Erickson holding, as a case of first impression, should serve as a 
beginning—a first step in the expansion of a “truer” phase of sex equity in the 
workplace.  There is a range of positive possible impacts, beginning with 
improved economic and physical well-being for women.  Overall, Erickson 
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will prove to benefit employers and employees.  As prescription contraceptive 
drugs and devices are covered, they will be more accessible to all women, and 
hopefully this means that more will utilize them.  This will result in fewer 
unintended pregnancies, which will benefit women who are not yet prepared 
for motherhood.  Further, because many prescription plans extend to the 
spouses and children of employees, and since the Johnson Controls holding 
that female employees and spouses of male employees must enjoy the same 
coverage, this holding will affect entire families.  The holding will also benefit 
families in allowing for more convenient family planning.  While not a 
complete remedy to the problem of unintended pregnancy, especially for 
highly impoverished women, it still will have an effect on the reproductive 
behavior of a large group of women. This in turn could have a positive effect 
on government programs when women who cannot afford birth control 
continue to have children.  It will also benefit the employers and insurers 
sponsoring coverage.  Though the monthly pay-outs (or periodic pay outs, 
depending on the drug or device chosen) will rise for insurers, the high costs of 
pregnancies will drop as they are prevented. 
Looking at the dynamic economy of risk management, we see that costs of 
coverage spread out so that all pay for the treatment of some.  This means that 
after Erickson the cost of prescription contraceptive coverage will be spread 
out over all beneficiaries.  This author cannot see a more appropriate way of 
doing things, especially since it is typically the woman who feels the brunt of 
not only pregnancy but of unwanted pregnancy, regardless of what she decides.  
Despite the fact that it has taken so long for a federal court to decide this issue, 
it was well worth the wait.  The Erickson holding will benefit in countless 
ways virtually all individuals and entities involved—women and men, children 
and families, insurers and employers. 
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